Didn't you know? Mirativity does exist!

KEES HENGEVELD AND HELLA OLBERTZ

Abstract

This paper argues, contra Hill (this volume), that mirativity is an independent linguistic category. It also argues, contra DeLancey (1997), that this category should be defined not only in terms of newsworthiness for the speaker but also in terms of newsworthiness for the addressee, and that expressions of mirativity do not necessarily have an evidential component. These claims are supported by examples of mirative expressions in a number of languages from different genetic stocks. Finally, the paper suggests an explanation for the fact that in many languages evidentiality and mirativity are indeed expressed by the same linguistic means.

Keywords: evidential, exclamative, inflection, information structure, mirative, modality, resultative, sentence type, syntax

1. Introduction

Nathan Hill (2012) suggests that DeLancey (1997) erroneously sees mirativity everywhere and that many facts put forward by DeLancey could also be explained assuming a basic evidential meaning for the elements involved. In our view N. Hill (2012) makes the opposite mistake and erroneously sees evidentiality everywhere, partly due to a too undifferentiated view of evidentiality. We will claim in our contribution that mirativity is a linguistic category that does exist, independently of evidentiality, though it should be defined differently from the way it was defined in DeLancey (1997).

In Section 2 we will first present our adapted definition of mirativity and set it off from related categories such as evidentiality and exclamativity. We then present in Section 3 a number of examples of languages with a mirative that is not used for evidentiality at all. In Section 4 we then argue that even in those languages in which evidentiality and mirativity make use of the same expression format, it is often still useful to consider the mirative as a sepa-
rate manifestation of that form. The article is rounded off with a conclusion in Section 5.

2. Mirativity

DeLancey (1997) characterizes mirativity as a category that has to do with the “status of the proposition with respect to the speaker’s overall knowledge structure” (DeLancey 1997: 33) and defines it as marking “both statements based on inference and statements based on direct experience for which the speaker had no psychological representation” (DeLancey 1997: 35). There are two aspects of this definition that we consider infelicitous.

First of all, DeLancey makes it part of the definition of mirativity that it has an evidential use apart from its use as signalling new information. This is probably a result of the fact that in the languages DeLancey discusses these two uses are shared by single forms. In contrast, we would like to use a definition in which the term “mirativity” is exclusively used in relation to the newness or newsworthiness of a proposition, since, as we will show in Section 3, there are languages in which the mirative is exclusively used in this sense. The fact that in many languages the same form may be used to express both mirativity in our sense and evidentiality then requires an explanation, but not one that forces them into the same definition.

Secondly, DeLancey defines newness or newsworthiness in relation to the speaker, which is surprising, as one of his own examples from Kalasha clearly has to be interpreted differently:

(1) Amerika’ bo hu’tala dur kai ši’-an
    America very high house make PST.PF-3PL
    hu’la.
    become.PST.INFER.3
    ‘In America there are very tall buildings.’ (DeLancey 1997: 47)

This sentence, according to DeLancey (1997: 47), “could be said by someone who is returning from the wide world with stories for his fellow villagers”. It is evident that in this context the proposition is not one for which the speaker does not have a psychological representation, but rather one that is new for the addressee.

In our view, then, mirativity could simply be defined as “a linguistic category that characterizes a proposition as newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising”. The category will often be used in circumstances in which the proposition is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising for the speaker, but may also be used when it is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising for the addressee.

Note that the newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising proposition may also be an anticipated one, which explains the use of the mirative in true questions. The
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following example anticipates our discussion of Ecuadorian Highland Spanish in Section 3.3:

(2) ¿De qué parte ha sido usted?  
from which part AUX.PRES.3SG COP.RES YOU.POL  
‘Where are you from?’ (Bustamante 1991: 213)

The periphrastic mirative construction in Ecuadorian Highland Spanish is used here not to express the speaker’s surprise about a proposition – it is this proposition that he shows his ignorance of – but rather his eagerness to acquire the new information that the answer will contain.

Adapting the definition of mirativity such that it includes newsworthiness for participants other than the speaker explains many of the cases Hill fails to understand, such as his examples (28) and (49), from Tibetan and Sunwar, respectively, where the mirative is used in recounting dreams. The same kind of explanation holds for the Kalasha example (1) discussed above, Hill’s example (58). Hill objects that in (1) the past inferential la cannot mark “unprepared mind” or “new information” because, at the moment of telling it, the content of (1) would be rather old information for the speaker. It does, however, contain new information for the addressee, whose minds the speaker assumes not to be prepared.

Our simple definition covers cases like these and does not require further assumptions about implicatures. As we will show below, by separating mirativity from evidentiality and by removing the restriction of the definition to the speaker, problematic examples can be interpreted straightforwardly.

Before turning to the data, we will briefly address the relation between mirativity and two neighbouring notions, i.e., evidentiality and exclamativity. As regards the first one, the frequently quoted “unprepared mind” seems to be what miratives have in common with evidentials, i.e., “the psychological distancing from the event” (Slobin & Aksu 1982: 196). In line with this view, Lazard (1999) proposes to include mirativity and evidential meanings in a wider category to be called “mediative”, where “mediative” corresponds to the meaning “as it appears”; the “mediative” is the marked case, which contrasts with the unmarked case, i.e., the lack of evidential or mirative marking. In fact, Lazard’s “mediative” blurs the concept of evidentiality in order to accommodate mirativity. In our view, evidentiality is related to the source of a propositional content, whereas mirativity is related to the evaluation of the propositional content (cf., e.g., Plungian 2001). Note furthermore that the idea that miratives and evidentials share the meaning of “psychological distance” does not hold for all types of evidentiality: evidentials that simply mark that the speaker has directly witnessed the event described in the proposition do not mark “psychological distance” at all.
As regards the concept of exclamativity, what mirativity and exclamativity have in common is that both give expression to the speaker’s view that the content of the utterance in question is somehow remarkable. Given that several studies fail to properly distinguish between miratives and exclamatives\(^1\) and that the two concepts were mistakenly fused in Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 70–76), we wish to emphasize here that, whereas we use the notion of exclamativity as an illocutionary concept, we consider mirativity a modal distinction (Olbertz 2009, forthcoming). More specifically, the grammaticalized form of the exclamative illocution is a specific sentence type that occurs in a mutually exclusive distribution with other sentence types, such as declarative, imperative, and interrogative. In contrast, mirativity occurs within different sentence types, and therefore it is not a sentence type itself. A further difference is that exclamatives have the exclusive function of expressing the speaker’s evaluation of some propositional content, which is presupposed rather than being asserted, whereas miratives are not necessarily speaker-bound and form part of propositions that are asserted or questioned rather than being presupposed.\(^2\)

3. Languages exhibiting a mirative category

3.1. Introduction

In this section we will consider six languages in detail that exhibit a mirative category that does not mark evidentiality at all. Three of these languages are also discussed by N. Hill (2012), but we will give a different interpretation to the facts of these languages in the light of the new definition we have given above. The languages to be discussed are Tarma Quechua (Section 3.2), Ecuadorian Highland Spanish (Section 3.3), Xamamauteri (Yanomami) (Section 3.4), Kham (Section 3.5), and Cupeño (Section 3.6), two of which, i.e., Tarma Quechua and Xamamauteri, belong to the relatively small group of languages with a grammatical marker with an exclusively mirative function.

3.2. Tarma Quechua

Tarma Quechua and a number of related dialects are spoken in the northwestern part of the Peruvian department of Junín. Tarma Quechua and the closely re-

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\(^1\) Without making any mention of exclamativity, several authors in Johanson & Utas (eds.) (2000) provide examples in which both mirativity and exclamativity are linguistically coded, which creates confusion given the fact that the latter obviously adds to the effect of surprise. See, e.g., examples (10) and (11) in Perry (2000), example (40) in Boeder (2000), and example (54) in Friedman (2000).

\(^2\) For more details on exclamatives see, e.g., Zanotti & Portner (2000) on Italian, Collins (2005) on English and Beyssade & Marandin (2008) on French. One of the few typological studies of this phenomenon is Michaelis (2001), who, however, fails to distinguish exclamatives from other emphatic constructions (cf. Olbertz forthcoming).
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lated Paracaos Quechua (spoken in Huaral, department of Lima) belong to the few languages that have a grammatical formative with the exclusive function of expressing mirativity. We will first consider this expression, then its interaction with tense and illocution and the restrictions on its use.

The grammatical formative with this function in Tarma Quechua is the verbal morpheme -na-, originally referred to as “sudden discovery” by Adelaar (1977: 95–100). In spite of its non temporal properties, Adelaar classifies “sudden discovery” as a tense because -na- (-naq- for 3rd person Agens/Subject) occupies the tense-slot in the agglutinative verbal morphology.

The Tarma Quechua examples quoted by N. Hill (2012) and not taken seriously as instances of mirativity are from oral narratives and have the typical property of not expressing the surprise of the speaker, but are intended to surprise the audience (Adelaar 2010). In fact, the speaker may have had knowledge of the facts in question for quite some time, but still use the mirative. Consider the following example from Paracaos Quechua, which behaves the same in this respect:

(3) Altu-čaw ka-yka-nqa-y-kamam-a:/s
    highlands-LOC be-PROG-NML-1.A/S-DLMT-CERT
    intrega-qa-ma:-ñaq mamá-y.
    give.away-PF-IO/IO-3A/S.MIR mother-1.Poss
    ‘While I was staying in the highlands, my mother had given me away [in marriage].’

Paracaos and Tarma Quechua thus use the mirative as a stylistic device in verbal interaction in order to indicate that some fact is new or unexpected for the addressee rather than for the speaker.

Let us now consider the interaction of the Tarma Quechua mirative with tense. Given the fact that -na- occupies a tense-slot, miratives themselves are not tensed, but can refer to events in the past and the present and even to events that have not yet been realized. An example of the latter is (4):

    weigh-PF-2.A/S.IMP let.us.see how.much-REPORT be-3.A/S.MIR
    ‘Weigh it, let us see how much it is!’ (Adelaar 2010)

In this example, -naq marks the knowledge that has not yet been acquired, and as such it has the pragmatic effect of emphasizing the speaker’s interest in acquiring this knowledge.

The mirative in Tarma Quechua is not restricted to declaratives only. In the following example, it occurs in a rhetorical question:

(5) \(\text{Ima-sh ga-naq, rachak-shi kinra-n kinra-n} \)
\(\text{what-report be-3.A/s.MIR toad-report side-3.POSS side-3.POSS} \)
\(\text{čura-naka-ra:-ri-na[q]} \)
\(\text{place-recip-PF-PL.3.A/s.MIR relay.runner-COMPAR-ADD} \)
\(\text{‘What had actually happened? The toads had posted each other on different spots along the track as in a relay-race.’} \)

Again, the use of the mirative in this example is motivated not by the speaker’s surprise but by the expected curiosity and ensuing surprise of the addressee.

In Tarma Quechua the coding of the mirative is incompatible with negation, which, however, seems to be an idiosyncratic property of this dialect, for which as yet no explanation has been found. Interestingly, there is no such restriction in the dialect of Paracaos (Adelaar 2010). The same holds for the many other Quechuan languages where the mirative is a secondary usage of the narrative past or perfect (see Faller 2004 for a discussion) morpheme \(-s(h)ka\).

### 3.3. Ecuadorian Highland Spanish

Although the phenomenon described here is by no means restricted to urban speech, but occurs at least equally frequently in rural areas (Toscano Mateus 1953: 260), we have chosen to concentrate on the Spanish spoken in Quito. The reason is that we want to show that the mirative is a general feature of Ecuadorian Highland Spanish in spite of the fact that it probably originates from historical language contact with Ecuadorian Quechua, where the mirative is coded in an analogous fashion (cf., e.g., Muysken 1985: 391). Like in the previous section, we will first consider the formal expression of the mirative and then its use, with particular attention to its interaction with tense and illocution, and to the restrictions on its applicability.

The mirative in Ecuadorian Highland Spanish is a secondary function of the auxiliary construction \(\text{haber} \) ‘have’ + past participle, the default function of which is to express resultative or experiential perfect aspect. Consider the following examples:

(6) a. \(\text{De albaricoque ha sido.} \)
\(\text{from apricot AUX.PRES.3SG COP.RES} \)
\(\text{[Speaker is looking at a jampot she has not seen before:] ‘It’s from apricot (I see).’ (fieldnotes, Quito 2003)} \)

b. \(\text{Me dieron penicilina a ver si} \)
\(\text{me.DAT give.PST.PF.3PL penicillin to see if} \)
\(\text{era alérgico, y... he sido} \)
\(\text{be.PST.IMPF.1SG allergic and AUX.PRES.1SG COP.RES} \)
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alérgico
allergic

‘They gave me penicillin to see if I was allergic and . . . (it turns out) I am allergic.’ (fieldnotes, Quito 2002)

While in (6a) the propositional content is newsworthy for the speaker, the proposition marked by the mirative construction in (6b) concerns something known to the speaker, and is expected to be a surprise to his audience. In the following example, the proposition is not expected to be surprising but just new and noteworthy for the addressee:

(7) [y] entonces el monumento a Artigas ¿no? que
and then the monument to Artigas tag rel
ha estado ahi
aux.pres.3sg cop.res(contingent) there
[explaining a walking route to a stranger:] ‘and then the monument to Artigas that is there (you know)’ (Bustamante 1991: 216)

As regards the interaction of the mirative with tense, the present tense form may be used for reference to the future:

(8) El año que viene ha sido bisiesto.
the year rel come.pres.3sg aux.pres.3sg cop.res leapyear
‘(I just realize) next year is a leapyear.’ (Toscano Mateus 1953: 260)

For reference to the past, the past imperfective form of the auxiliary is used, the tense/aspect function of which would be pluperfect. (9) is an example of the mirative in a past tense context:

(9) Me agarré de un árbol y no
refl.1sg hold.pst.pf.1sg prep a tree and neg
había sido.
aux.pst.impf.3sg cop.res
[speaker talks about her suddenly stumbling in the jungle:] ‘I held on to a tree and it turned out not to be one.’ (fieldnotes, Quito 2003)

As we already mentioned in Section 2, the use of mirativity in Ecuadorian Highland Spanish is not restricted to declaratives, but can also concern true questions such as given in (2), where the mirative is used to indicate that the speaker considers the answer to his or her question to be newsworthy. Similarly, the mirative is used in questions informing about the wellbeing of the addressee:

(10) ¿Cómo te ha ido?
how you.dat aux.pres.3sg gone
‘How are you?’ (Fieldnote, Quito 2003)

Both (2) and (10) are particularly polite ways of asking, because they emphasize the speaker’s interest in the answer.

Finally, it should be noted that unambiguously mirative uses of *haber* + past participle are all states, because these are the ones that cannot have a perfect or pluperfect reading. As a consequence, the Ecuadorian Highland Spanish mirative is virtually restricted to non-verbal predications (cf. also Bustamante 1991: 218).

3.4. Xamamauteri (Yanomami)

Xamamauteri is a dialect of Yanomami, an indigenous language of Northern Amazonia, which is described in Ramirez (1994). This language is of special interest for the current discussion as it has a rich evidential system as well as, as we intend to show here, a dedicated mirative marker. Within the evidential system there are markers for direct perception, deduction on the basis of perceptual evidence, and reportativity.

The dedicated mirative marker is -*nohi*, the meaning of which is defined by Ramirez (1994: 170) as follows: “Avec la modalité évidentielle nohi, le locuteur exprime que l’énoncé est une information nouvelle, souvent très saillante, de première main: c’est ce qu’il sait pour l’avoir vu, entendu, goûté ou senti (évidence des sens)” (Ramirez 1994: 170). Some examples illustrating this marker are the following (Ramirez 1994: 170–171):

   `He went yesterday, I have seen it.'

b. Hei éhë-rë tê-horã-nohi-ku-i.
   `This is the thing that, reportedly, is yours.' [Said while showing to the owner a lost object that everybody was looking for and that has just been discovered.]

c. Ya-nohi-hu-ima-he!
   `I inform you that I just arrived!'

Ramirez treats -*nohi* as part of the evidential system, and claims the form is used when the utterance contains firsthand information. The examples confirm this conclusion, but also show that the fact that these utterances contain firsthand information is actually not expressed by -*nohi* itself but rather by the evidential suffix -*i*, which is used when the speaker has personally witnessed the event described within the utterance. The marker -*nohi* thus is responsible for the ‘surprise’ reading of the utterance, while the marker -*i* is responsible for
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the interpretation of these utterances as being supported by direct perception by the speaker.

The sentence in (11b) is especially interesting, as it contains two evidential markers, one for direct perception and one for reportativity, as well as the mirative marker. This clearly shows that mirativity is not a secondary reading of either a marker of direct perception or of reportativity, as N. Hill (2012) maintains. The sentence in (11c) is of further interest as it shows that the newsworthiness of the content of the utterance is not only evaluated from the speaker’s perspective, but also from the perspective of the addressee, as in the previous examples.

3.5. Kham

Kham is one of the languages N. Hill (2012) dismisses as not being an example of a language with a mirative. In his endeavour to prove the evidential character of the Kham mirative, Hill quotes the following two examples, of which (12a) is clearly a case of direct perception, and (12b) a case of inference on the basis of perception. They are, therefore, two completely different cases when seen from the evidential perspective:

(12) a. \textit{Manlal-lai te “e baboi manlal na-ko zo ci Manlal-o foc hey man Manlal dist-at emp cep sy\-d\-s u-li-zya-o oleo sani”}.
sleep-NF 3SG-be-CONT-NML MIR CONFIRM
‘(I said) to Manlal, “Hey man, Manlala, he’s right there sleeping, see!”’

b. \textit{Na-khurja ya-s\-a-moi-wo oleo.}
my-knife 1SG-CAUS-LOSE-NML MIR
‘I lost my knife!’ (I just discovered it).

For N. Hill (2012) both of these examples (Watters 2002: 291, 292) are proof that the use of mirative oleo has to do with sensory evidence. Hill’s argumentation shows that he mixes up the two types of evidential meaning that we distinguished in Section 2: in the first evidential meaning, illustrated in (12a), a speaker indicates that he or she perceived the event reported in the clause directly; in the second, illustrated in (12b), a speaker indicates that he or she infers the occurrence of the event on the basis of perceptual evidence. By mixing up these two categories, virtually any example can be presented as one involving sensory evidence. However, from the mirative perspective taken by Watters (2002) himself, both examples are similar and can be perfectly interpreted as cases of propositions that are newsworthy or surprising.

More importantly, Watters (2002) provides various examples where the mirative is used in a situation in which perception by the speaker is irrelevant.
or not at stake, but which can be explained straightforwardly if interpreted as cases in which a proposition is new to the addressee, not to the speaker. The following example illustrates this:

(13) \[\text{Ri-te ge-ka:h la:-ye bai-d}\]
\[\text{nightINESS FOC 1PL-dog leopard-ERG take-NF}\]
\[\text{o-ya-si-u oleo.}\]
\[3SG-give-2PL-NML MIR}\]

‘In the night a leopard took our dog away on us!’ (Watters 2002: 292, 293)

This sentence is uttered by someone telling about events that happened in the past and in which the speaker participated. The mirative is here thus not used to express surprise on the part of the speaker, but makes perfect sense if the newness of the proposition to the addressee is taken into account.

A final piece of evidence in favour of the interpretation of *oleo* as a mirative marker and not as an evidential comes from the fact that it may combine with the counter-expectancy particle *ci*, as illustrated in (14):

(14) \[\text{Aw-te zya:h-ro ci oleo.}\]
\[\text{this-PL FOC witch-PL CEP MIR}\]

‘These are witches!’ [I had assumed they were little old ladies.] (Watters 2002: 296)

Here the mirative cannot be interpreted as relating to perceptual evidence. The witches were there all the time and being perceived all the time. It is the new knowledge about the entities involved, contrary to what the speaker had assumed (hence the CEP marker), that triggers the use of the mirative particle *oleo* here.

3.6. Cupeño

J. Hill (2005: 66–69) discusses the clitic =*(a)m* as a mirative marker in Cupeño and states that it “is used to express that the utterance is based on unimpeachable firsthand knowledge where the speaker is usually speaking in the moment of discovery”. She states that in some cases the clitic does not satisfy DeLancey’s (1997) criteria. An example in which it does is the following (J. Hill 2005: 66), uttered by a bird when Coyote arrived unexpectedly at a church service conducted by birds, who are potential prey:

(15) \[\text{Isi-ly=am!}\]
\[\text{coyote-NPN=MIR}\]

‘It’s Coyote!’
Examples that do not satisfy DeLancey’s (1997) criteria, and that N. Hill (2012) adduces as evidence for his claim that =am in Cupeño is not a mirative, are the following:

(16) a. Paana-t=am=el \ku-t-im.\[\text{tarantula=NPN=MIR=3PL.ABS fire-NPN-PL}\]
   ‘Tarantulas are dangerous.’

b. Supleweet=am=’ep amay=’ep ne-miyax-wen\[\text{one=MIR=R just=R 1SG-be-PST.IMPF.ST ne-ye pe-na’aqwa.}\]
   1sg-mother 3sg-child
   ‘I was my mother’s only child.’ (J. Hill 2005: 67)

In both cases the speaker is not presenting a proposition that is new to him- or herself. Example (16a) is a generic statement, and in (16b) the (female) speaker has of course been aware of the fact that she was an only child all her life. The use of the mirative is perfectly understandable if the newsworthiness of the propositions these messages contain for the addressee is taken into account. J. Hill (2005: 67) mentions this explicitly with respect to example (16b) when she comments that the mirative “here may convey that this may be a surprise to the listener in a community where most families are large, so that she must insist or highlight the fact”. With respect to sentence (16a) she notes that it “seems to gain a sort of insistent quality from the use of the mirative” (J. Hill 2005: 67). Both comments fit into our revised definition of mirativity, which includes the perspective of the addressee.

A final point to be noted is the use of the mirative clitic in questions. Here, as in (2) and (10) above, it is the potential newsworthiness of the answer rather than the newsworthiness of the proposition that is at stake, as in the following example:

(17) Me=1 hi-ngax=am ngen-ax-we?\[\text{and=3PL.ABS what-from=MIR fun.PL-CL-PRES.PL}\]
   ‘Why are they running?’

As J. Hill (2005: 68) notes, this sentence would be uttered by a speaker observing the runners. The newsworthiness is in the explanation for their running, as questioned by the question word hingax ‘why’.

### 3.7. Intermediate conclusion

The case studies in this section have shown that counterexamples to DeLancey’s (1997) definition of mirativity disappear if newsworthiness is defined not only in relation to the speaker, but in relation to the addressee as well. In such an approach no link whatsoever with evidentiality has to be assumed, and
mirativity can be defined as a category in its own right. This does not relieve us of the task of explaining why in many languages the expression forms for mirativity overlap or coincide with those for evidentiality. We turn to this issue in the next section.

4. Mirativity and evidentiality

Although we have illustrated above that languages may have a mirative category without evidential meaning, it is clear from the examples in DeLancey (1997), Aikhenvald (2004, 2012), and N. Hill (2012) that in many languages mirativity and some type of evidentiality are expressed by the same grammatical formative. Since, like Aikhenvald (2004: 195), we do not believe that evidentiality is a necessary part of the meaning of miratives, as DeLancey (1997) does, nor that mirative meaning is just evidential meaning, as Lazard (1999) and N. Hill (2012) do, a different explanation is needed for this frequent co-occurrence of meanings in a single form.

An explanation we would like to consider here is that the mirative and evidential uses of a single grammatical formative may be the result of the formative having participated in two different grammaticalization paths with distinct endpoints. In such a scenario the homophonous mirative and evidential markers have a common origin, but one that is distinct from either one of them. Thus mirativity does not derive from evidentiality, nor the other way around. One possible common origin of evidentiality and mirativity that we will consider here is resultative aspect.4

Bybee et al. (1994: 95–97; cf. also Boland 2006: 190) discuss a frequently attested path of grammaticalization that leads from resultatives (their "antecedors") to evidentials of indirect evidence. Languages displaying this pathway mentioned in Bybee et al. (1994) include Inuit, Newari, Tucano, Turkish, and Udmurt. It is not difficult to see why such a pathway should manifest itself in many unrelated languages: it is a small step from the result of an event to the inference of the nature of that event on the basis of the result it left behind (cf. also Comrie 1976: 108–110). The relationship between resultativity and evidentiality can be observed very well in Turkish, where the non-witnessed evidential suffix on main verbs (18a) is homophonic with the suffix of the resultative participle (18b):

(18) a. 

4. We avoid the use of the term “perfect” here as it is too overloaded with possible interpretations.
b. ağac-ten yer-e düşmüş bir elma
   tree-ABL ground-DAT fall-RES indef apple
   'an apple fallen from the tree to the ground' (Kornfilt 1997: 416)

The development from resultative to evidential can be seen as a shift in focus from the result of an event to the event itself. A similar shift occurs when a resultative changes into a marker of anterior tense. The difference is that in the case of evidential meaning this event is presented as inferred, whereas in the case of anterior meaning it is not.

A second path of grammaticalization that to our knowledge has not been explicitly noted in the literature is from resultative aspect to mirativity.5 Consider the following mirative example from Ecuadorian Highland Spanish:

(19) se ha quedado acá... yo metí el papel-ito mientras buscaba a Andrea.
   refl.3 aux.pres.3sg stayed here I put.pst.pf.1sg the paper-DIM while seek.pst.impf.1sg prep Andrea
   [Speaker is opening her bag and discovers a doctor’s prescription she had been looking for earlier, when seeing it, she remembers how it got there:] ‘it is here [lit., it has remained here]! ... I put the little paper [here], while I was looking for Andrea.’

It is not difficult to imagine that results from past events that have not been witnessed or have been forgotten may very well be surprising or unexpected, as in the case illustrated in (19). A generalization of this implicature then leads to the formation of a mirative category. Note that this development is analogous to the development from resultative to evidential, with the important difference that in this case the focus stays on the result rather than on the event that led to that result. A similar change occurs when a resultative changes into a stative (cf., e.g., Vaxtin 1988: 201–203 on Asiatic Eskimo). The difference is that in the case of mirative meaning the result is presented as newsworthy or unexpected, while in the case of stative meaning it is not.

Thus, considering the two temporal reference points in a resultative construction – the temporal reference point of the event and the temporal reference point of the result – in grammaticalization processes evidential meaning links up with the first and mirative meaning links up with the second. This division of labour also points to an explanation of the fact that the two homophonous categories can survive side by side. Given the association of evidentiality with the event and mirativity with the result, we expect that in languages in which

5. However, the relation between newsworthiness and the use of the perfect has been observed in earlier studies, such as in McCawley’s (1971: 104–110) stipulations on the “hot news” perfect, the licensing of which depends on the estimated knowledge of the addressee.
the processes above have taken place, the evidential meaning preferably arises in dynamic predications, while the mirative meaning preferably arises in stative predications. The Permic languages Komi and Udmurt (Leinonen & Vilkuna 2000) seem to be a case in point: the “unwitnessed past”, also termed “PST2”, which has a primarily resultative meaning (Leinonen & Vilkuna 2000: 503–507), expresses mirativity with stative and inferential evidentiality with dynamic events. Consider the mirative use in (20a) and the evidential one in (20b) from Udmurt:

(20) a. Mis’a, gaškô, te munin n’in. A tani na
I.think perhaps you go.pst1.2sg already but there still
völömyd.
be.pst2.2sg
‘I thought you had already gone. But here you still are.’ (Leinonen & Vilkuna 2000: 501)

b. Vojnas zeröma
nightNESS.3sg rain.pst2
[It is morning. The speaker wakes up, looks out of the window and sees that the courtyard is wet:] ‘It has rained at night.’ (Leinonen & Vilkuna 2000: 499)

Comrie (2000: 6) remarks that, in addition to Permic, miratives in Turkic languages, in Tajik, and in Georgian, which have the common property of being etymologically related to resultative aspect, are all “restricted to stative verbs like ‘be’ and ‘know’”. The explanation suggested here also finds support in the fact that in several of the languages that DeLancey (1997) discusses there is a clear connection between evidentiality/mirativity on the one hand and resultativity on the other. Following the order of presentation in DeLancey (1997), this seems to be the case in Turkish, Sunwar, Tibetan, and Kalasha. Furthermore, the diachronic sources that DeLancey (2012) mentions for the mirative markers in Kham (the copula), Khowar (‘become’), and for Tibetan ‘dug’ (‘sit, be located’) are not incompatible with a scenario in which a resultative construction plays a role. The evidence in all but the Turkish case is, however, too incomplete to be conclusive.

5. Conclusion

We have argued that mirativity is a category in its own right and have suggested a new definition, which describes mirativity as a linguistic category that characterizes a proposition as newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising. This definition is different from the one presented in DeLancey (1997) in that (i) the proposition may be newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising to the addressee as well as to the speaker and (ii) evidential meaning is not included in the defi-
nition. Applying this new definition, we identified a number of languages that could be shown to have miratives without associated evidential meanings. We furthermore suggested that the fact that in many languages evidentiality and mirativity do share the same expression format can be explained when it is assumed that both derive historically from a construction in which that same expression format had a third meaning. The example we elaborated was that of evidential and mirative meanings going back to resultative meaning.

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Abbreviations: 1/2/3 1st/2nd/3rd person; a actor; abl ablative; abs absolutive; add additive; aux auxiliary; caus causative; cef counterexpectation; cert certainty; cl class; compar comparative; confirm confirmation; cont continuous; cop copula; dat dative; dim diminutive; dist distal; dlm conjunctive; emp emphasis; erg ergative; foc focus; hest hesternal; imp imperative; impf imperfective; indef indefinite; iness inessive; infer inferential; io indirect object; loc locative; mir mirative; neg negation; nf non-finite; nml nominalizer; nonspec non-specific; np poss possessor; npn non-possessed noun; o object; perf perfect; pf perfective; pl plural; pol polite; poss possessive; prep preposition; pres present; prog progressive; prox proximate; pst past; r realis; recip reciprocal; recipst recent past; refl reflexive; rel relative; report reportative; res resultative; s subject; sg singular; st stative; top topic; vent ventive; witn witnessed.

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Didn’t you know? Mirativity does exist!  

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