Illocutionary Conversion, Bystander Deixis, and Romance 'Ethic' Pronouns
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Illocutionary Conversion, Bystander Deixis, and Romance ‘Ethic’ Pronouns

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0. Introduction

In this paper, I offer a description and analysis of the so-called 'ethic dative' pronouns found in contemporary French and Galician.¹ I shall show that these pronouns do not behave like the 'non-lexical' datives discussed in much recent work, and need instead to be analysed as a separate class of items. The analysis proposed yields a bipartite or tripartite division of 'dative' pronouns in these languages — a division which, in terms of Functional Grammar, translates into a distinction between propositional and illocutionary value.

1. The 'Standard' View of French Non-Subject Clitics

Standard accounts of non-subject clitic pronouns, both within the French prescriptive tradition (see, for instance, Grevisse 1993:§657) and within modern descriptive linguistics (see, for instance, Jones 1996:252-254), refer to constraints on their distribution — specifically, restrictions on their co-occurrence and an upper limit on the number which may appear in a cluster. 'Classical' generative grammar found these problems famously intractable, leading to Perlmutter's celebrated but ultimately ad hoc proposal (Perlmutter

¹ My initial work on this topic was carried out whilst I was a Visiting Fellow in the Department of Linguistics at La Trobe University, Bundoora, Australia, during July and August 1998, and I should like to thank my colleagues there, especially Kate Burridge and Barry Blake, for providing a stimulating environment in which to pursue these ideas. This paper has also benefited from my discussions with Claire Badiou, Machtelt Bolkestein, Louis Goossens, Julia Herschenson, Lachlan Mackenzie, Martin Maiden, Christiane Marchello-Nizia, Pat Lunn, Manolo Puga Moruxa, Yves Simon, Catherine Travis, Françoise Vaissière, Nigel Vincent, and Ian Watson. All errors are, of course, my own.
1970; 1971) that, unlike most other syntactic phenomena, the distribution of these items was governed by surface structure ‘filters’ or ‘templates’.

1.1. Order of occurrence before the verb

The order in which proclitic pronouns must occur in contemporary French is represented in Table A. (I shall not be concerned in this paper with the enclitic pronouns found with positive imperatives. Abbreviations are listed in an appendix.)

**TABLE A: PROCLITIC PRONOUN ORDER IN FRENCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2P &amp; 3P-REFL</td>
<td>3P-NR-ACC</td>
<td>3P-NR-DAT</td>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>PART/GEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>me</em> (1P-SG)</td>
<td><em>le</em> (3P-M-SG-ACC)</td>
<td><em>lui</em> (3P-SG-DAT)</td>
<td><em>y</em> (LOC)</td>
<td><em>en</em> (PART/GEN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>te</em> (2P-SG)</td>
<td><em>la</em> (3P-F-SG-ACC)</td>
<td><em>leur</em> (3P-PL-DAT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>nous</em> (1P-PL)</td>
<td><em>les</em> (3P-PL-ACC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>vous</em> (2P-PL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>se</em> (3P-REFL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We may note the following neutralizations:
- of gender (M/F) and case (ACC/DAT) in first and second person forms
- of gender (M/F) in third-person plural forms (regardless of case)
- of gender (M/F) in third-person dative forms (regardless of number)
- of number (SG/PL), gender (M/F), and case (ACC/DAT) in third-person reflexive forms

The ‘dative’ encodes any ‘affectee’, whether or not a beneficiary or indirect object in the narrow sense (for some discussion, see Melis 1996). Thus,

(1)

a. *Je lui ai donné un livre.*
   I to-him/her have given one book
   ‘I gave him/her a book.’

b. *Elle leur a chanté une chanson.*
   She to-them has sung one song
   ‘She sang them a song.’
c. *Ils lui ont volé cinquante euros.*

They to-him/her have stolen fifty euros

‘They stole fifty euros from him/her.’

d. **Nous leur avons caché la vérité.**

We to-them have hidden the truth

‘We hid the truth from them.’

etc.

1.2. **Distributional Restrictions**

As noted above, there are various syntactic restrictions governing clusters of proclitic pronouns. More precisely, three constraints appear to exist — two concern the co-occurrence of these items; one sets an upper limit to the number that can occur in a cluster.

1.2.1. **Co-occurrence constraint (i)**

(i) No more than one clitic from any group (each of columns I-V in Table A) may occur in a cluster:

(2) a. *Il me te donnera./*Il te me donnera./ Il te donnera à moi.

He me you will-give/He you me will-give/He you will-give to me

‘He will give you to me.’

b. *Elle les la paiera./*Elle la les paiera.

She them it will-pay/She it them will-pay

‘She will pay it for them’

(cf. c. *Elle paiera cette voiture 15 000 euros.*

She will-pay that car 15,000 euros

‘She will pay 15,000 euros for that car.’)

d. *Je lui leur ai acheté la voiture.*

I to-him/her to-them have bought the car

i) ‘I bought the car from him/her for them.’

ii) ‘I bought the car from them for him/her.’
(2d) exemplifies what I shall henceforth refer to as the 'no double dative constraint': even where two dative pronouns might be semantically justified, on account of the different values of the dative (which in this case may encode the source or the beneficiary of the transaction), the sequence is ruled out by the syntax. (2b) appears to exemplify a comparable 'no double accusative' constraint; although here the data are less clear-cut, as one of the pronouns is a circumstantial complement rather than a direct object (for discussion, see Smith 1992). We may therefore be dealing with a single constraint ruling out two occurrences of the same case.

1.2.2. Co-occurrence constraint (ii)

(ii) First- and second-person forms (in column I in Table A) and third-person datives (in column III in Table A) are incompatible:

(3) a. *Elle te lui a présenté./√ Elle t'a présenté à lui.
   She you to-him/her has introduced/She you has introduced to him
   'She introduced you to him'

   b. √ Elle te l'a présenté.
   She you him has introduced
   'She introduced him to you'
1.2.3. Upper limit constraint

(iii) No more than two clitics may occur in a cluster:

(4) *Il le leur y a donné.
    He it to-them there has given
    ‘He gave it to them there’

2. ‘Ethic’ pronouns in French

2.1. The data

The second-person forms may appear in a role which is not obviously covered by any of the conventional labels for grammatical functions (‘direct object’, ‘indirect object’, etc.) or cases (‘accusative’, ‘dative’, etc.). None the less, pronouns with this value are generally assumed to involve a special use of the dative case, partly because of an analogous use of the dative in Latin, and are conventionally referred to as ‘ethic (or ethical) datives’. However, the use of this case-label is not axiomatic. I return to this issue in §2.3. below. The function in question is difficult to define (both Seuren (1976:23) and Jaeggli (1986:22-23) further note that it is difficult, if not impossible, to translate into English, as witness the rather free translations offered of the example sentences below), but it amounts to apostrophizing or calling for the affective complicity of the addressee. More rarely, it is alleged that the first-person forms may appear in a similar role — that of throwing into relief and more or less consciously commenting on the affective complicity of the speaker (see, for instance, Le Bidois & Le Bidois 1967: §249; Grevisse 1993§647e). Relatively little work has been done on ethic pronouns; but some discussion can be found in Leclère (1976:84-95) and Sitaridou (1998).

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2 This constraint is not absolute. Although many informants reject sentences such as (4), Grevisse (1993:§657,3) observes that sequences of three clitics with en or y as the final element are occasionally found: “En et y peuvent se trouver aussi en troisième position, mais cela n’est pas fréquent dans l’usage”. Both he and Togeby (1982:431) quote the example On vous l’y montrera ‘They will show it to you there’ from Sartre’s Les Séquestrés d’Altona.
At first blush, ethics appear to have certain properties in common with the 'non-lexical datives' or 'affected datives' discussed by, amongst others, Barnes (1980; 1985), Olsson (1984), Rooryck (1988), Authier & Reed (1992), Branchadell (1992), and Herschensohn (1996:70-82). 'Non-lexical' or 'affected' datives constitute a heterogeneous class of items, encompassing such uses as the dative of inalienable possession (5), the 'datif épistémique' of Ruwet (1981; 1982) (6), and the sometimes overlapping 'datif de localisation' of Olsson (1984) (7):

(5) *Tu lui as cassé la jambe.*
You to-him/her have broken the leg
‘You broke his/her leg.’

(6) *Je lui croyais une maîtresse dans chaque port.*
I to-him believed a mistress in each port
‘I thought he had a mistress in every port.’

(7) *Je lui trouve beaucoup de charme.*
I to-her/him find much of charm
‘I find her/him charming’; ‘I find she/he has a lot of charm.’

Like these items (which I shall henceforth refer to as 'non-lexical affectees'), ethics can only ever be clitics; they can never surface in any other position (hence the label 'non-lexical', which can apply equally well to ethics). In this respect they are quite unlike indirect object clitics. For instance, we do not find emphatic postverbal ethics (9) or clefted ethics (10):

(8) a. *Il te l’a donné.*
He you it has given
‘He gave it to you.’

b. *Il te le lui a acheté.*
He you it to-him/her has bought
‘He bloody well went and bought it from him/her’
‘He bought it from him/her, if you please’

(9) a. *Il l’a donné à toi, pas à moi.*
He it has given to you, not to me
‘He gave it to you, not to me.’
b. *Il le lui a acheté à toi, pas à moi.
   He it to-him has bought to you, not to me
   (cf. *'He bought it from him/her, if you please, not if I
   please.')

(10) a. √ C'est à toi qu'il l'a donné.
   It is to you that he it has given
   'It's you he gave it to.'

   b. *C'est à toi qu'il le lui a acheté.
   It is to you that he it to-him/her has bought
   (cf. *'It's bloody well that he went and bought it from
   him/her')

Nor can ethics appear as interrogative pronouns:

(11) a. √ À qui l'a-t-il donné?
   To whom it has [t] he given?
   'Who has he given it to?'

   b. *À qui le lui a-t-il acheté?
   To whom it to-him/her has [t] he bought?
   (cf. *'From/for whom did he bloody well go and buy it?')

However, despite these similarities, it is fairly clear that ethic clitics are not
'non-lexical affectees'. They have a different semantic-pragmatic value, as
noted by Authier & Reed (1992:296):

ethical datives [...], unlike affected datives, denote individuals who are not
necessarily interested parties as far as the process denoted by the sentence is
concerned, but rather, this type of non-lexical dative refers to individuals whose
relation to the process denoted by the sentence is only that of potential witness.

and by Borer & Grodzinsky (1986:211), for whom "E[thic] D[atives] [...] convey [...] in essence the effect of an event on a seemingly uninvolved party". Moreover, they obey an additional set of syntactic constraints. Rooryck
(1988:98), following Olsson (1984), points out that there are in fact some
circumstances in which some 'non-lexical affectees' may surface as lexical
items; they are 'marginally lexical', rather than 'non-lexical'. Ethics can never
surface as lexical items, under any circumstances. In addition, Jones
(1996:301) notes that ethics "can violate the normal constraints on
compatibility of clitics" (outlined in §1.2 above), mentioning violations of
constraints (i) and (ii). In fact, unlike any other type of clitic, including 'non-
lexical affectees', ethics can freely violate all three of the distributional restrictions, including the upper limit condition (iii). Hence, of the following examples, all from published sources, (12-13) violate constraint (ii) (groups I and III incompatible), whilst (14) violates constraint (i) (no more than one from any group) and constraint (iii) (upper limit of two):

(12)  *Je te lui allonge une paire de claques.*  
I you to-him extend one pair of slaps  
'So I goes and slaps his face for him.'  
(Droz, *Entre Nous*, cit. Nyrop 1925:$\S$191)

(13)  *Je te lui envoie une dépêche.*  
I you to-him send one telegram  
'So I goes and sends him this telegram.'  

(14)  *Ce bougre-là [...], je vais te me le caller au bloc.*  
That bloke there [...], I go you me him stick to-the block  
'I'm bloody well going to throw that one in the slammer (just you watch/you'll see).'  
(Gary, *Racines du ciel*, cit. Grevisse 1993:$\S$647e)

And note that, whilst a dative pronoun with a verb such as *acheter* can indicate either the source or the beneficiary (the vendor or the recipient), as in

(15)  *Il le lui a acheté.*  
He it to-him/her has bought  
'He bought it from him/her.' or 'He bought it for him/her.'

and, as expected, it is impossible for both of these functions to be encoded simultaneously by a clitic pronoun (the 'no double dative' constraint) (compare 16a and 16b), we do find a superficially similar sentence in which the second-person pronoun is an ethic (16c):

(16)  *Il te le lui a acheté.*  
He you it to-him/her has bought  

a.  *He bought it from you for him/her.'  
b.  *He bought it for you from him/her.'  
c.  ✓ 'He bloody well went and bought it for/from him/her.' /
   'He bought it for/from him/her “if you please”.'
and which apparently violates constraints (ii) (groups I and III incompatible) and (iii) (upper limit of two). Compare also

(17) *Il te prend un petit couteau de cuisine et il te le lui plante dans le dos.*

He you takes one small knife of kitchen and he you it to-him sticks in the back

'He goes and picks up this little kitchen knife and goes and stabs him in the back with it.'


Another peculiarity of ethics is that there may be more than one of them in a given cluster. It may seem that this point has already been made in the discussion of constraints (i-iii) above, but the argument is in fact slightly different. At one level, the requirement that no more than one clitic from any group may occur in a cluster is simply a *formal* restriction, as shown by (2a), where each of the clitics has a different case (accusative vs. dative), but the sentence is none the less ungrammatical, because the forms both belong to group I. We have already seen that ethic clitics can violate this *formal* constraint. But we have also seen that, sometimes in the case of group I and always in the case of groups II and III, the constraint additionally has a *functional* motivation: that is, what is being ruled out is not just two forms drawn from the same group, but two occurrences of the same case — a double accusative or a double dative — as shown by (2b) and (2d). Ethic clitics can violate this *functional* restriction, too — in other words, we do not find a 'no double ethic' constraint. Compare (18-19) below.

(18) *Avez-vous vu comme je te vous lui ai craché à la figure?*

Have you seen how I you-SG you-PL to-him have spat to the face?

'Did yer see how I went and spat in his face, then; did yer?'


(19) *Il te vous enguirlanda le sénateur.*

He you-SG you-PL garlanded the senator

'He only went and gave the Senator a bollocking, didn’t he.'


The upper limit on ethic clitics seems to be determined by a simple restriction on multiple occurrences of the same pronoun. Seuren (1976:22) notes, in another context, that "there is a universal constraint on clitic clusters which rules out two consecutive occurrences of phonologically identical clitics". This
seems to be but a special case of what Radford (1979:24) calls the 'Like Form Constraint'.

So far, we have seen that ethics are strictly non-lexical and may violate the co-occurrence and upper limit constraints (i-iii). There are other crucial respects in which the syntax of ethics is unlike that of other clitic pronouns (including 'non-lexical affectees'). Unlike other clitics, it is impossible for ethics to occur in negative sentences:

\[(20)\]
\[
a. \quad \textit{Il ne te l’a pas donné.} \\
\quad \text{He NEG you it has NEG given} \\
\quad \text{‘He didn’t give it to you.’}
\]
\[
b. \quad \textit{*Il ne te le lui a pas acheté.} \\
\quad \text{He NEG you it to-him/her has NEG bought} \\
\quad \text{‘He bloody well went and didn’t buy it from/for him/her.’}
\]

or in interrogative sentences:

\[(21)\]
\[
a. \quad \textit{\checkmark Te l’a-t-il donné?} \\
\quad \text{You it has [t] he given?} \\
\quad \text{‘Has he given it to you?’}
\]
\[
b. \quad \textit{*Te le lui a-t-il acheté?} \\
\quad \text{You it to-him/her has [t] he bought?} \\
\quad \text{\(\text{cf. \textit{*‘Did he bloody well go and buy it from him/her?’}}\)}
\]

\[(22)\]
\[
a. \quad \textit{\checkmark Est-ce qu’il te l’a donné?} \\
\quad \text{Is it that he you it has given?} \\
\quad \text{‘Has he given it to you?’}
\]
\[
b. \quad \textit{*Est-ce qu’il le lui a acheté?} \\
\quad \text{Is it that he you it to-him/her has bought?} \\
\quad \text{\(\text{cf. \textit{*‘Did he bloody well go and buy it from him/her?’}}\)}
\]

Nor can ethics undergo ‘deictic shift’ — compare

\[(23)\]
\[
a. \quad \textit{Il te l’a vendu à Jean pour trente euros.} \\
\quad \text{He you it has sold to Jean for thirty euros} \\
\quad \text{‘He went and sold it to Jean for thirty euros.’}
\]
\[
b. \quad \textit{*Il a dit qu’il le lui avait vendu à Jean pour trente euros.} \\
\quad \text{He has said that he it to-him had sold to Jean for thirty euros} \\
\quad \text{‘He said he went and sold it to Jean for thirty euros.’}
and contrast (24) with (25):

(24) a. *Je vais te le donner.*
    I go you it give
    'I'm going to give it to you.'

    b. *Il a dit qu'il allait le lui donner.*
    He has said that he went it to-him give
    'He said he was going to give it to him.'

(25) a. *Je vais te le coller au bloc.*   (cf. 14)
    I go you him stick to-the block
    'I'm going to throw him in the slammer.'

    b. *Il a dit qu'il allait le lui coller au bloc.*
       (* with relevant meaning)
    He has said that he went him to-him stick to-the block
    'He said he was going to throw him in the slammer.'

    c. **Il a dit qu'il allait lui le coller au bloc.*
       (even worse than 25b)
    He has said that he went to-him him stick to-the block
    'He said he was going to throw him in the slammer.'

Note the clear difference here between ethics and many 'non-lexical affectees'. The latter, when coreferential with the subject, can be shifted to the third-person reflexive form *se*.

(26) a. *Je vais me le coller au bloc.*
    I go me him stick to-the block
    'I'm going to throw him in the slammer.'

    b. *Il a dit qu'il allait se le coller au bloc.*
    He has said that he went 3P-REFL him stick to-the block
    'He said he was going to throw him in the slammer.'

(27) a. *Je vais me boire une bière.*
    I go me drink one beer
    'I'll have myself a beer.'

    b. *Il a dit qu'il allait se boire une bière.*
    He has said that he went 3P-REFL drink one beer
    'He said he'd have himself a beer.'
This fact invites comparison with constructions such as (28), in which \textit{se} can occur as a 'non-lexical affectee', but is not the result of deictic shift.

\textit{(28) \hspace{1cm} On va se boire une bière.}
\begin{quote}
One goes 3P-REFL drink one beer
'We'll have ourselves a beer.'
\end{quote}

It is clear, then, that, in crucial syntactic respects, ethics form a distinct class of clitic pronoun.

\subsection*{2.2. A comparison with Galician}

The existence and behaviour of ethic clitics in other Romance languages is a complex issue, which lies outside the scope of this paper. However, it is worth drawing a comparison between French and Galician, where, in contrast to some other Romance languages, sentences with ethic pronouns are not found mainly on the lips of linguists seeking confirmation of their existence, but constitute a frequently and spontaneously used resource of the language. The situation is described as follows by Álvarez, Regueira & Monteagudo (1986:174-175)

\begin{quote}
É moi frecuente o uso do pronome dativo para implica-lo interlocutor nos feitos que se narran ou nas opiniôns que se expresan, ós que en principio era alelo, procurando a súa solidariedade, a súa complicidade ou simplemente unha maior aproximación afectiva entre el, a mensaxe e o emisor. Ó tratarse dunha implicación do interlocutor,unicamente poden usarse \textit{che} e \textit{vos} ou, como formas do tratamento cortés, \textit{lle} e \textit{llas}. É frecuente que \textit{che} acompañe expletivamente a un \textit{lle} e \textit{llas}.\textit{ahi}.
\end{quote}

We may note that, in the second person singular, Galician makes a distinction between an accusative clitic \textit{te} and a dative clitic \textit{che}, and that it is the latter which surfaces as the ethic pronoun. Here, then, it might seem that there is a morphological argument in favour of regarding the ethic as a type of dative; but, once again, the syntactic facts argue against this analysis. I shall return to this issue below.

\textsuperscript{3} 'We very frequently find the dative pronoun used to implicate the interlocutor in the events which are being related or in the opinions which are being expressed, when he is in principle not involved in them. The effect is to procure his solidarity, his complicity, or simply a greater affective closeness between him, the message, and the speaker. As it is the interlocutor who is implicated, only [the second-person forms] \textit{che} and \textit{vos}, or the polite forms \textit{lle} and \textit{llas}, can be used in this function. An expletive \textit{che} is often found with one of the other pronouns of solidarity, especially \textit{vos}.'
Examples of Galician ethic pronouns are given in (29) (from Rodríguez González 1958:714) and (30-32) (from Álvarez, Regueira & Monteagudo 1986:174-175,204-205)).

(29) a. *Voucheme mercar uns zapatos.*
   I-go-to-you-me buy some shoes
   'I'm going to buy some shoes.'

   b. *Perdéucheseme o libro.*
   Lost-to-you-REFL.-me the book
   'My book has gone missing.'

   c. *Dóicheme moito a cabeça.*
   Hurts-to-you-me much the head
   'I have a splitting headache.'

(30) *Meu pai vaiche a peor, que a vellez no ten cura.*
My father goes-to-you to worse, that the old-age not to-you has cure
'My father is getting worse, because there's no cure for old age.'

(31) a. *Non che me gustou nada.*
   Not to-you-SG. me pleased nothing
   'I didn't like anything.'

   b. *Non me vos gustou nada.*
   Not me to-you-PL. pleased nothing
   'I didn't like anything.'

(32) *Non lle me dixo nadiña de nada.*
Not to-him/her me said-3P.SG nothing-DIM of nothing
'He didn't say anything at all to me.'

The Galician data broadly parallel the facts about French. As far as their distribution is concerned, ethic clitics may violate the co-occurrence restrictions which otherwise hold for the language. Specifically, ethics can precede the third-person reflexive clitic *se* (compare 29b), despite the constraint that *se* must be the first clitic in a cluster (Álvarez, Regueira & Monteagudo 1986:204). The order *che se* rather than *se che* is frowned upon by prescriptive grammarians, but is not infrequent in actual usage. Likewise, sequences of ethics are grammatical, provided the forms themselves are different (in other words, the only upper limit on ethics appears to be set by the 'Like Form Constraint'). As in French, ethics in Galician can only ever be clitics; they can
never surface in any other position — so we do not find emphatic postverbal ethics or clefted ethics. They appear to be incompatible with interrogation and with ‘deictic shift’. However, as (31-32) demonstrate, Galician is unlike French in that ethics are found in negative sentences.

2.3. Are ethics datives?

As mentioned above, ethics are generally assumed to involve a special use of the dative case, partly because of an analogous use of the dative in Latin, and are conventionally referred to as ‘ethic (or ethical) datives’. However, the use of this case-label is not axiomatic. Certainly, in French (and most other Romance languages), where we find no overt case distinction in the first- and second-person clitics, there is no compelling a priori morphological reason to label the forms used in this context as datives. On the other hand, we have observed that, in the second person singular, Galician distinguishes between an accusative clitic te and a dative clitic che, and that it is che which appears in the role of ethic pronoun. In this case, the morphological data might support a view of the ethic as a type of dative.

At the level of propositional syntax, where ethic pronouns do not behave like accusative or dative clitics, there is little justification for regarding these items as a subcategory of the dative. In French, at least, it appears that we can do so only at the cost of abandoning the ‘no double dative’ constraint, but only in a particular ad hoc case; or else by imposing a special ad hoc condition on this constraint. In his discussion of related phenomena in another Romance language, Bull (1965:262), noting that “Spanish is no longer Latin”, goes so far as to claim that the terms ‘ethical dative’ and ‘dative of interest’ (see below) “are deceptive and should be abandoned”. But, as we shall subsequently see, the position changes somewhat once we adopt an analysis of sentences containing ethics which goes beyond the level of the proposition. I shall suggest below that the label ‘dative’ can be justified on pragmatic grounds.

2.4. A typology of datives

So far, I have assumed a tripartite distinction: indirect objects (lexical datives), ‘non-lexical affectees’, and ethics. However, we have observed that the distinction between the first two categories is not watertight (see also Branchadell 1992). Álvarez, Regueira & Monteagudo (1986:174-175) propose a somewhat different three-way split, distinguishing the following functions of
the dative pronoun in Galician: ‘obxecto indirecto (indirect object)’, ‘dativo de interés (dative of interest)’, and ‘dativo de solidariedade (dative of solidarity)’. According to these authors, the indirect object indicates a beneficiary or recipient (see also ibid.:522), and includes certain ‘non-lexical affectees’, such as datives of inalienable possession; the dative of interest indicates a person who has particular interest in the action, because they are advantaged or disadvantaged by it; and the dative of solidarity (already defined in §2.2.) creates a closer affective link between the hearer, the speaker, and the utterance. It might be possible to characterize these three functions in terms of participation and involvement, as follows:

**TABLE B: A FEATURE-BASED TYPOLOGY OF DATIVES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>indirect object</th>
<th>dative of interest</th>
<th>dative of solidarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>involvement</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fourth putative possibility, [+involvement, −participation], is clearly ruled out by the logical assumption that participation entails involvement, but not vice versa.

The definition of the ‘dative of solidarity’ as [−involvement] may at first sight seem surprising; but, as Álvarez, Regueira & Monteagudo (1986:174-175) make clear, we are properly dealing with a ‘dative of appeal to solidarity’, implying that, at the outset, the hearer is not involved in the utterance or the message it conveys (see also Authier & Reed 1992:296). Of course, the notions of ‘involvement’ and ‘participation’, which I have introduced informally, remain to be defined in detail — an enterprise which I shall not attempt in this paper. It would not be surprising, however, if the boundaries of these notions turned out to be blurred. A non-discrete theory, such as Cognitive Grammar (see especially Langacker 1991:209-260), might envisage a ‘dative cline’, which would regard indirect objects as prototypical datives and the heterogeneous class of ‘non-lexical affectees’ as less prototypical datives, with datives of interest situated on the edge of this class, and ethics lying beyond it, on the very periphery of dativeness.

It is fairly clear that what I have been terming ‘ethic’ pronouns correspond to Álvarez, Regueira & Monteagudo’s ‘datives of solidarity’. It is these items which are the focus of this paper, and I shall be less concerned in what follows with the precise identity of indirect objects or datives of interest and the
potentially fuzzy boundary between these two categories. However, one
relevant fact should be mentioned here. It seems clear that, despite a commonly
held view (see Le Bidois & Le Bidois 1967:§249; Grevisse 1993:§647e), forms
such as me in (14) — repeated as (33) — and in (34), and se in (28) — repeated
as (35) — represent datives of interest, as distinct from ethics.

(33)  \textit{Ce bougre-là [...]}, je vais te me le caller au bloc.

That bloke there [...] I go you me him stick to-the block
‘I’m bloody well going to throw that one in the slammer (just you
watch/you’ll see).’

(Gary, \textit{Racines du ciel}, cit. Grevisse 1993:§647e)

(34)  \textit{Hé, tu m’as oublié une gueuze.}

Hey, you me have forgotten one gueuze
‘Hey, you’ve forgotten a gueuze beer (you were supposed to put
on my tray).’

(waiter, overheard in bar, rue de Dunkerque, Paris, 1995)

(35)  \textit{On va se boire une bière.}

One goes 3P-REFL drink one beer
‘We’ll have ourselves a beer.’

In each case the pronoun is non-lexical; it behaves like an ethic (and unlike
many ‘non-lexical affectees’) in being omissible without consequences for the
grammaticality of the sentence, but is unlike an ethic in being able to appear in
interrogative and negative sentences, in being able to undergo deictic shift (see
26 above), and in being unable to violate the co-occurrence and upper limit
constraints (i-iii). Semantically, too, these pronouns appear, on examination, to
encode interest, which rests on involvement, rather than solidarity, which rests
on non-involvement (see Table B above). (The involvement in (33) and (35),
where the dative pronoun is coreferential with the subject, has a slightly
different nuance from the involvement in (34), where it is not; but this fact does
not invalidate the general observation.) Although Le Bidois & Le Bidois
(1967:§249) conflate these pronouns with true ethics under the heading
“pronom explétif d’intérêt personnel”, their comments on the two forms
confirm these differences — they give examples of deictic shift involving first-
person, but not second-person forms; they note that it is mainly the second-
person forms which appear in this (allegedly unified) function; and they
distinguish between the role of the first-person pronoun, which “sert à marquer
l’intérêt que la personne qui parle prend à la chose en question”, and that of the
second-person form, which is used “pour inviter un interlocuteur (ou le lecteur) à s’intéresser tout spécialement à la chose dont on parle”. A similar approach is adopted by Grevisse (1993:§647e): ethics and datives of interest are treated as a single category, but a distinction is drawn between the first-person form, which is used “pour exprimer l’intérêt que le locuteur prend à l’action” and the second-person form, which is used “pour solliciter l’interlocuteur de s’intéresser à l’action”. In other words, as suggested above, the first-person form encodes prior involvement (almost by definition), the second-person form does not. In fact, even this characterization is over-simplified. More accurately, the first-person form must encode prior involvement, the second-person form need not, but may — in addition to functioning as ethics, second-person forms are also found as datives of interest, indicating involvement, and manifesting the syntactic distribution characteristic of such pronouns; compare (36):

(36) \( il \ t'a \ oublité \ une \ gueuze. \)

He you has forgotten one gueuze
‘He’s forgotten a gueuze beer (he was supposed to put on your tray).’

I claim that in French, as in Galician, true ethic pronouns can have only second-person reference. The first- and third-person datives of interest in (33-35), as well as their second-person counterpart in (36), have been confused with ethics because they behave even less prototypically than many other ‘non-lexical affectees’ and lie nearer to ethics on the ‘dative cline’; however, their semantics and the fact that they can appear in interrogative and negative sentences and can undergo deictic shift, but may not violate any of the clitic co-occurrence and upper limit constraints (i-iii) demonstrate that they are not ethics. If a label is required to distinguish them from other datives of interest, we might term them ‘pseudo-ethics’. In as much as they characteristically encode prior involvement (especially, but not exclusively, that of the speaker), they have a quasi-modal value.

2.5. Revising the schema

If we were to revise Table A to take account of the data examined so far, the new table would have the following characteristics. There would be six slots, not five, with an additional column ‘O’, containing the forms te and vous, being inserted before the existing I. (These forms would continue to be listed under I,
and would therefore be the only forms to appear twice in the table). Pronouns from column ‘0’ would be compatible with pronouns from any of the other columns, and this slot could be multiply filled, subject to phonological constraints barring a sequence of two identical forms. The constraints already stated on the five columns I-V would continue to hold.

However, whilst descriptively adequate, this revision offers no real account of the phenomena observed. It is to this question that I now turn.

3. The view from Functional Grammar

3.1. Presentation

Ethic clitics pose some interesting theoretical problems. Seuren (1976:23), in what amounts to a counsel of despair, claims: “not only the facts are unclear, but also the issues involved. We do not know [...] how to deal with ethical datives, whose origin, both semantically and syntactically, is entirely mysterious”. I want to suggest that the outlook is not quite as bleak as Seuren maintains. Ethic pronouns are curious, but not entirely unanalysable. I propose in what follows to look very briefly at the account of ethics which might be offered by Functional Grammar. Working out the details and testing the hypotheses will, of course, require much further research.

3.2. Parallel structures

As we have seen, there are at least three types of dative pronoun — indirect objects stricto sensu, datives of interest, and ethics/datives of solidarity. Functional Grammar is a particularly fruitful theory within which to explore the similarities and differences between these various types of dative, as it explicitly proposes parallel linguistic structures for what many theories regard as separate and quasi-autonomous levels of analysis. In particular, it clearly articulates the relationship between syntax and discourse. Within this framework, we might claim that indirect objects stricto sensu were arguments and formed part of the predication (the core syntactic structure of the sentence, corresponding to the ‘state of affairs’); that datives of interest, with their quasi-modal value, lay outside the predication, but formed part of the proposition (a higher level of analysis, corresponding to a ‘possible fact’); and that ethics lay outside both predication and proposition, forming part of the clause...
(corresponding to the speech act). In this way, all datives could be regarded as indirect objects, but defined at different levels of structure. Schematically:

(indirect object of) clause
   ethic/dative of solidarity
   e.g., *Il te le lui a acheté.* (cf. 8a; 16, etc.)
   He you it to-him/her has bought
   ‘He bloody well went and bought it for/from him/her.’

(indirect object of) proposition
   dative of interest
   e.g., *Il t’a oublié une gueuze.* (cf. 34; 36)
   He you has forgotten one gueuze
   ‘He’s forgotten a gueuze beer (he was supposed to put on your tray).’

(indirect object of) predication
   indirect object
   e.g., *Il t’a donné mille euros.* (cf. 1a; 8a)
   He you has given thousand euros
   ‘He has given you a thousand euros.’

An alternative analysis is suggested to me by Louis Goossens (personal communication). Both indirect objects and datives of interest could be analysed as forming part of the predication; but the former would be recipients, and hence be part of (or central to) the argument structure, forming part of the inner predication, whilst the latter would be beneficiaries, and therefore outside (or peripheral to) the argument structure, forming part of the outer predication. As this paper is essentially concerned with ‘ethic’ datives, which, I claim, are unambiguously located in the clause or illocution, I shall not be concerned here with the detailed analysis of the other types of dative.

We have seen that the traditional terminology of ‘ethic dative’ is in one sense misleading — nothing in the morphology (at least in most Romance languages) or the syntax of the forms in question indicates that they are dative — but the use of this term receives some justification from the fact that they represent an indirect object at some level of analysis, albeit not that of the predication or proposition.
3.3. Ethics as ‘illocutionary converters’

More specifically, ethics could be viewed as ‘illocutionary converters’ of the type discussed by Dik (1997:245): these are “linguistic elements and devices through which the basic illocution of a clause may be grammatically converted into some other illocution”. Ethics would arguably have the function of converting Declaratives into Exclamatives (a grammatical conversion which is intuitively plausible, although not mentioned by Dik in his (non-exhaustive) list of such operations (ibid.:243)). This process might be formalized as in (37):

\[(37) \quad [2P\text{-CLITIC [Decl]} > \text{Excl}]\]

3.4. ‘Bystander deixis’

The claim that ethic pronouns are illocutionary converters is a plausible description of their function, but it is relatively unexplanatory. What lies behind this process?

In terms of the parallel structures which Functional Grammar assigns to different levels of analysis, the speech act/clause/ilocution takes three arguments: the speaker as its subject, the proposition as its direct object, and the addressee as its indirect object. One way of viewing an ethic pronoun, therefore, would be as an explicit encoding of the addressee as indirect object. Such explicit encoding of a function which is normally implicit (that is, not encoded by an overt element) may be seen as emphatic, and would be entirely in keeping with the conversion of a Declarative into an Exclamative.

In a sentence containing an ethic pronoun, then, the addressee is encoded explicitly, and therefore emphatically. However, we might also make the not incompatible claim that the addressee in such sentences was encoded multiply — once in the implicit, default, structure of the illocution, and once by the overt ethic pronoun. Recent work by Rijkhoff (1995; 1998) on ‘bystander deixis’ may be relevant in this connection. Rijkhoff (1998:52) notes: “Although speech act theories usually take into account only two parties of the verbal exchange (speaker S and addressee(s) A), there are many situations in which the form of S’s utterance is co-determined by the presence of sanctioned or non-sanctioned bystanders who are within earshot of the speaker”. If we claim that the addressee is sufficiently encoded qua addressee in the structure of the illocution, then the overt ethic clitic must represent the addressee in some other
function. I suggest that this function is that of 'bystander' (or, in the words of Authier & Reed (1992:296), "potential witness").

To suggest that ethic pronouns are instantiations of 'bystander deixis' might at first sight seem bizarre and even contradictory — the addressee is not a bystander in any normal definition of the term. However, the notion of 'non-involvement', adduced earlier, is crucial here. What ethic pronouns appear to be doing is conveying the non-involvement of the addressee at the moment of the utterance by encoding the addressee as a bystander. It is this metaphor which enables the speaker to solicit the addressee's (subsequent) involvement and which provides a higher-order mechanism for the illocutionary conversion.

4. Conclusion

In this short paper, I have merely tried to sketch some problems posed by the existence and behaviour of Romance ethic clitics, and sought to show how we might begin to account for these problems within the framework of Functional Grammar. Almost all the real work still needs to be done. But the underlying issue is clear. Unlike other pronouns, ethics have no propositional content. They lie outside the argument structure of the sentence, where they remain unresolved, and receive an interpretation only at the level of illocution. Functional Grammar offers us three insights into the analysis of these items:

- By making available perspicuously parallel linguistic structures for what many theories regard as separate and quasi-autonomous levels of analysis, it enables us to show that ethic datives, or 'datives of solidarity', are structurally similar to other types of dative, but are crucially non-propositional, and must be analysed at the level of the speech act or clause rather than at any lower level. Only in this way can their apparently idiosyncratic syntactic behaviour be accounted for.
- The notion of 'illocutionary converter' provides us with a clear descriptive account of the function of ethic pronouns, which arguably convert Declaratives into Exclamatives.
- The notion of 'bystander deixis' provides us with a higher-order explanatory mechanism for this 'illocutionary conversion', in the form of a metaphorical encoding of the addressee as a bystander.
ABBREVIATIONS

ACC = accusative
DAT = dative
DIM = diminutive
F = feminine
GEN = genitive
PL = plural
LOC = locative
M = masculine
NR = non-reflexive
P = person
PART = partitive
REFL = reflexive
SG = singular

REFERENCES

ROMANCE ‘ETHIC’ PRONOUNS


