On the layering of underlying clause structure in Functional Grammar
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0. Introduction

One of the most salient features of the recent version (Dik 1989) of Functional Grammar (hereafter FG) is the layered representation of clause structure. It is now generally held in the FG community that the underlying clause structure (UCS) consists of three main hierarchically organized layers, called "Predication", "Proposition" and "Illocution". The predication is the kernel of the UCS; it can be itself divided into three different substructures: (a) the "nuclear predication", (b) the "core predication" and (c) the "extended predication". The predication expresses, when extended, a State of Affairs (SoA) symbolized by an SoA variable $e_1$ which is specified by the core predication, predication operators $\pi_2$ (Tense, external phrasal aspect, quantificational aspect, objective mood and positive/negative polarity) and predication satellites $\sigma_2$ (Temporal, Locative and Cognitive adverbial expressions). The role of the proposition is to express a (possible) fact. This layer contains a propositional variable $X_i$ specified by the extended predication, propositional operators $\pi_3$ (i.e. grammatical means expressing the attitude of the Speaker towards the propositional content) and propositional satellites $\sigma_3$ (i.e. attitudinal satellites such as in my opinion, probably, certainly, etc.). The full UCS is arrived at by inserting the proposition into the layer expressing the speech act conveyed by the clause. This layer consists of an illocutionary variable $E_i$, illocutionary operators $\pi_4$ and illocutionary satellites $\sigma_4$ (i.e. adverbial expressions belonging to the frankly paradigm). The general form of the UCS can be represented by schema (1):

$$[\pi_4E_i; [\pi_3X_i; [\pi_2e_1; [\pi_1[\text{Pred arg}^*](\sigma_i)](\sigma_2)](\sigma_3)](\sigma_4)]$$

The predication, the proposition and the illocution are taken as pertaining

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1 I am grateful to Lachlan Mackenzie for his valuable comments and for correcting my English.
to different *levels*: while the first of these layers is "representational" in nature, the last two belong to the "interpersonal" level.

This paper is a part of a wider study in which I present a certain number of suggestions relating to some crucial aspects of this kind of representation. My specific aim, here, is to show that the number of layers needs to be reconsidered. On the one hand, other possibly relevant layers are to be taken into account, in particular a sentence-type layer; on the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that certain established layers, namely the proposition and the predication, cannot be taken as constant parts of all types of clauses.

1. *Sentence-type vs. Illocution*

In Dik (1989), sentence-type and "basic" (=literal) illocution are, as far as I can judge, not differentiated. I will argue (a) that these are two distinct notions with different properties and (b) that these must, consequently, be represented in the UCS by different coding devices.

1.1. *Sentence-type as basic illocution*

In Dik's (1989: 256-258) view, two kinds of illocutions are to be distinguished: "basic" illocutions and "derived" illocutions. Basic illocutions are those illocutionary values such as Declarative, Imperative and Exclamative which are "the most pervasive sentence type distinctions made across languages". These illocutions are to be interpreted "as instructions from S to A to effect certain changes in A's pragmatic information":

(2) a. DECL: S instructs A to add the propositional content to his pragmatic information.

b. INT: S instructs A to provide him with the verbal information as specified in the proposition.
c. IMP: S instructs A to perform the controlled SoA as specified in the proposition.

d. EXCL: S instructs A to add to his pragmatic information that S finds the propositional content surprising, unexpected or otherwise worthy of notice.

These four basic illocutions may be "converted" into other illocutionary values, i.e. derived illocutions. Three kinds of "illocutionary conversions" are to be distinguished: (a) "pragmatic conversion", "effected at the level of intention and interpretation" with "no reflection on the linguistic properties of the expression"; (b) "lexical conversion", "in which the illocution is specified in some explicit performative verb or other lexical expression"; (c) "grammatical conversion", which takes place "when the language has certain grammatical means for changing the basic illocution of an expression into some derived illocutionary value". To Dik, only the illocutions which have formal (lexical or grammatical) correlates are to be dealt with in the linguistic expressions. This implies that basic illocutions, lexically and grammatically derived illocutions can be accounted for in the grammar proper while pragmatically derived illocutions are to be handled "in a wider pragmatic theory of verbal interaction". What is important for us to notice here is the fact that sentence type and basic illocution are taken as one and the same thing. It is this assumption that I wish to discuss in the following subsection.

1.2. Sentence type as an autonomous intra-clausal constituent

As is well known, there is a close correspondence between the sentence type of expressions and the basic illocution they convey: generally, a declarative clause carries an assertion, an interrogative clause expresses a

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2 In Moutauakil (1991), it is suggested that this kind of illocutionary conversion may be taken care of by inferential rules operating within the logical module.
question and an imperative clause an order:

(3) a. Declarative \(\leftrightarrow\) Assertion  
b. Interrogative \(\leftrightarrow\) Question  
c. Imperative \(\leftrightarrow\) Order

This correspondence cannot justify, however, the assimilation of the two notions. Here are some observations which clearly show that they must be differentiated:

(i) Obviously, sentence type refers to the formal (morpho-syntactic) configuration of the linguistic expression, while basic illocution is a content feature, i.e. the speech act performed in producing it.

(ii) The illocutionary potential of linguistic expressions is not expressed only by their sentence type. Other (morpho-syntactic or prosodic) features can behave as illocution-indicating devices. Questions expressed only through the intonational contour such as (4) are the most well-known example:

(4) That’s your brother?

(iii) The same sentence type can be used to convey quite different illocations. Interrogative constructions, for example, can express questions as well as other illocations:

(5) a. Did John meet Mary?  
b. Will you give me your pencil?  
c. Haven’t I given you all my books?  
d. Why not build your house outside the town?
(5a) expresses a question while (5b), (5c) and (5d) convey a request, an assertion and a positive suggestion respectively.

(iv) Conversely, the same illocution may be conveyed through different sentence types. A request, for instance, may be expressed by an imperative, an interrogative or a declarative construction, as becomes clear from the following sentences:

(6) a. Close the window, please!
    b. Can you close the window, please?
    c. I would like you to close the window.

(v) It frequently happens that the illocutionary potential of linguistic expressions undergoes a grammaticalization process. As I have shown elsewhere (Moutaouakil 1991), this process takes place in the following way: the (derived) illocution which is initially conveyed as an "implicature" tends to progressively become a literal illocution. As a consequence, the initial literal illocution tends, at the same time, to completely disappear. This is what happens in interrogative-negative constructions in general where the initial literal illocution, i.e. the question, is almost totally replaced by the literalized one, the positive assertion. In (5c), for example, the conveyed illocution is an assertion rather than a request for information. In the case of this type of construction, it is hardly possible to speak of any correspondence between the sentence type and the basic illocution, i.e. between the interrogative form and the assertive meaning.

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3 See for further detail on the literalization of implicated illocutionary force Moutaouakil (1992).
It is clear from these observations that sentence type and basic illocution are two distinct notions, although they are generally closely connected. The question which now arises is: given the current representation of the UCS in the recent version of FG, what is the most adequate way to code sentence type?

1.3. The representation of sentence type

Recall that, as can we see from (1) above, the UCS contains three kinds of elements: (a) lexical elements, (b) grammatical elements and (c) relational elements. Lexical elements consist of predicates and satellites belonging to various layers; grammatical elements are coded through operators, while relational elements are represented by (semantic, perspectivizing and pragmatic) functions. It is clear that we need no special argumentation to establish that sentence type is to be coded in the UCS as an operator, for it falls under the general characterization of that kind of element, that is, features which are realized by grammatical means. Indeed, sentence type crosslinguistically surfaces as a set of complementary morphological (special particles), syntactic (word order) and prosodic features.

For coding sentence type through an operator, two possibilities, as far as I can see, may be envisaged, both being compatible with the general principles governing the representation of the UCS. These two possibilities will now be presented:

(i) The fourth layer operator $\pi_4$ can be conceived of as consisting of two sub-operators: a sentence type operator $Tp$ and an illocutionary operator $ll$. In this view, the general form of the UCS would be (7):^4

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^4 In (7), the element which constitutes the specification of the variable $E_i$ is left unspecified for it can be either a proposition, a predication or a 'pseudo-predication' as will be shown in section 3.
Tp represents the sentence type to which the linguistic expression belongs while III stands for the basic illocution or some grammatically coded implicated illocution (Illocutions which are purely pragmatically derived are represented, as suggested in Moutaouakil 1991, in the inferentially derived UCS of the logical module).

The sentence type operator behaves as a trigger for the rules responsible for the specification of the general formal (morpho-syntactic and prosodic) properties of the expression. The main role of the illocutionary operator is twofold: (a) on the one hand, it indicates a part of the information required by the semantic interpretation; (b) on the other hand, it constitutes, as shown in Moutaouakil (1991), the point of departure for the logical inferential chain through which the implicated illocution is "calculated". It also may trigger the rules determining some morpho-syntactic and prosodic features, i.e. those which are sensitive to the (grammatically coded) implicated illocution. Let us give an example. The structure of the Arabic sentence (8a), paraphrasable by (8b), can be roughly represented as (9):

(8) a.  
hal sāʿadanī min ?aḥadin ?!
INT helped-me from someone-gen
'Did someone help me?'

b.  
lā ?aḥada sāʿadanī
no someone-acc helped-me
'Nobody helped me'

(9)  
[INT DEN E,: [sāʿadanī ?aḥad]]
Where DEN = Denial
In (9), INT represents the sentence type of (8a). It is meant to trigger the rule responsible for the interrogative particle \textit{hal}. The illocutionary operator DEN indicates the implicated illocution conveyed by (8). In so doing, it provides the information required by the illocutionary part of the semantic interpretation. Formally, it triggers the insertion of the particle \textit{min}, which occurs exclusively in (explicit or implicit) negative contexts.\textsuperscript{5} Both operators contribute to determining the intonational contour, the intonation being, as is well known, sensitive to the sentence type as well as to the conveyed illocution.\textsuperscript{6}

(ii) Alternatively, one can extend the UCS by adding a fifth layer which would contain Tp as its operator and the rest of the clause as its specification. In this view, the general form of the UCS would be something like (10):

\begin{equation}
(10) \quad [\pi_5 \pi_4 \pi_3 E_i; [...] ]
\end{equation}

Where $\pi_5 = \text{Tp}$; $\pi_4 = \text{Il}$

This means that a sentence like (8a) has, as its structure, (11) rather than (9):

\begin{equation}
(11) \quad [\text{INT}[\text{DEN} E_i; [\text{säʔadant}\ ?\text{ʔahad}]]]
\end{equation}

These two approaches to the opposition sentence type vs. illocution are empirically equivalent in the sense that they permit us to account for the same set of (formal, semantic and pragmatic) properties. The first

\textsuperscript{5} The behaviour of \textit{min} and other related morphemes is discussed in detail in Moutouakil (1986).

\textsuperscript{6} The intonation to be assigned to constructions such as (8a) is a mixture of Rise and Fall, which are the prosodic contours typically associated with interrogative and declarative respectively.
approach, however, might be preferred on theoretical grounds: it has, over the second approach, the advantage of describing these properties without requiring any modification in the current layered model of UCS. In this respect, it can be said to involve less costly devices and, thus to be more economical.

2. Is proposition a constant layer?

In the earlier version of FG (Dik 1978 and subsequent works), the underlying representation of linguistic expressions consisted of a predication, i.e. a structure containing a predicate and a certain number of terms (arguments and satellites). In recent FG works (Hengeveld 1988 and Dik 1989), a distinction is made between the predication and the proposition. The latter notion is conceived of as constituting an autonomous layer (i.e. a third layer) in the UCS of linguistic expressions, as shown in (1) above. As convincingly demonstrated by Dik (1989: 48, 248-250), this distinction is relevant in the sense that it permits a more adequate account of a certain number of facts. However, it is not required in all cases: contrary to what is stated in the current FG literature, the proposition is a relevant layer in certain constructions, but not in all types of sentences. In this section, I will show that there are good reasons to believe that proposition, as defined in Dik (1989), occurs preferably (and perhaps exclusively) in declarative sentences.

2.1 Proposition vs. Predication

In Dik (1989: 248-250), the predication and the proposition are presented as two quite distinct entities. The facts that are assumed to be a basis for such a distinction can be summarized in the following way:

(i) The predication is the expression of an SoA; the proposition designates a (possible) fact.
(ii) An SoA is an entity "which can be said to occur, take place, begin, last and end"; it "can be perceived: watched, heared, felt, etc; and can be said to be sudden, gradual, violent". As for possible facts, they pertain to sets of entities "which can be said to be believed, known, or thought"; which "can be reason for surprise or doubt; they can be denied and remembered and they can be said to be true or false in relation to the occurrence of some SoA in some world".

(iii) A certain number of facts require that these two notions be distinguished. Here are some of the examples discussed in Dik (1989: 248-251):

a. A verbal type of nominalization is appropriate for representing possible facts; a more nominal type of nominalization is the preferred expression of SoA's. This can be shown from the comparison between (12a) and (12b) (Dik's (9a) and (9b)):

(12) a. John deplored Peter's driving the car recklessly.
    = John deplored the fact that Peter drove the car recklessly.

    b. John deplored Peter's reckless driving of the car.
    = John deplored the reckless way in which Peter drove the car.

An expression such as (13) (Dik's (10)) is ambiguous between a fact interpretation and an SoA interpretation:

(13) John deplored Peter's driving.
    = (a) the fact that Peter drove
    = (b) the way in which Peter drove
b. In English, the difference between the anaphoric expressions *it* and *so* lies in the nature of the elements referred back to: *it* refers anaphorically to an SoA while *so* is used to refer back to a fact as becomes clear from the contrast (14a)-(14b):

(14) a. John saw that Mary was pregnant, but Peter didn’t see *it*/*so*

b. John thought that Mary was pregnant, but Peter didn’t think *so*/*it*

2.2. Proposition and Ilocution

The examples given above show that proposition must be postulated as an autonomous layer, distinct from predication. However, there are many good reasons to think that the propositional layer is restricted to only one type of sentences: declarative sentences. This implies that the postulation of this layer in the other types of constructions (i.e. interrogatives, imperatives and exclamatives) is an overgeneralization.

In order to argue for the idea that the proposition is not a constant layer, I will present two kinds of evidence: (i) the opinion of some thinkers and linguists and (ii) a certain number of linguistic facts which support the restriction of this layer to a particular type of constructions.

(i) As is well known, the notion of proposition has been closely connected, in the philosophical literature, to the notion of "statement" (or "assertion"), which is typically expressed by a declarative sentence. For many logicians only declarative constructions can be said to have, as their denotation, a proposition. Haussner (1980), in a study of the English declarative, imperative and interrogative in an extended Montague PTQ framework, convincingly argues that these three types of sentences do not have the same denotation: declaratives denote a proposition (i.e. "a
function from points of reference to truth-values"); imperatives denote a property ("roughly that property which the speaker wants the hearer to acquire"); as for interrogatives, they rather denote "a function from points of reference into sets of corresponding non-redundant answer constituent denotations". In his classification of the entities which can be involved in a linguistic expression, Lyons (1977) focuses on the necessity of distinguishing third-order entities which are abstract propositions (i.e. without temporal or location) from second-order and first-order entities consisting of SoAs and individuals respectively. Nevertheless, his definition of the notion of proposition (i.e. what is expressed by a declarative sentence when it is used to make an assertion) clearly implies that only assertive declarative constructions contain a (propositional) third entity. It is significant that all the examples given in the literature (including the FG works) in order to argue for the relevance of this notion are, with no exception, declarative sentences.

(ii) This tendency to restrict the notion of proposition to declarative constructions is largely justified if we take into account the following observations:

(a) One of the defining features of the proposition, as mentioned above, is that it can be said to be true or false. This property, as is well known, is specific to sentences expressing a statement. Furthermore, this is what has been regarded as the crucial difference between declarative and non-declarative (i.e. imperative and interrogative) sentences.

(b) As mentioned above, the distinction between facts and SoAs is established on the basis that the former can be said to be believed, known, thought, denied and remembered. A closer look at the data may show that these features are compatible
only with declarative constructions. Consider the following examples:

(15) a. I believe that Mary is an excellent syntactician.
    b. Do you believe that Mary is an excellent syntactician?
    c. *Believe that Mary is an excellent syntactician.

(16) a. I know that Nancy will come back tomorrow.
    b. Do you know that Nancy will come back tomorrow?
    c. *Know that Nancy will come back tomorrow.

I think that when we say that a fact is believed or known we generally mean that the speaker expresses his/her attitude (i.e. his/her belief or knowledge) towards the content of what he/she states. This is true only of declarative sentences such as (15a) and (16a). In this type of construction, the predicates believe and know are used to express the attitude of the speaker towards the propositional content embodied in the subsequent clause. In other words, they can be regarded as mere modal auxiliaries and, consequently, as realizations of propositional operators. This means, contrary to what is commonly held, that the constructions exemplified in (15a) and (16a) are not complex sentences containing a matrix and an embedded proposition; they rather consist of only one proposition (that Mary will come back tomorrow) which is modalized by a level-3 (or propositional) auxiliary, i.e. believe and know. In constructions such as (15b) and (16b), believe and know are not predicated of the speaker. Furthermore, they are used in a non-assertive context. As a consequence, it is hard to take them as level-3 modal auxiliaries. Rather, they are to be regarded as full predicates.
with a complex second argument. From the contrast between (15a)-(16a) and (15b)-(16b), we can deduce that a fact can be said to be known or believed only in declarative constructions where the expressions know or believe are used as modal auxiliaries meant to indicate the speaker's propositional attitudes.

(c) In Hengeveld (1988:6), proposition operators are defined as the grammatical means by which "the speaker specifies his attitude towards the (truth of the) proposition he puts forward for consideration". Hengeveld rightly points out that "they are therefore largely restricted to declarative sentences".

(d) The same observation holds for the so-called "propositional (or "attitudinal") satellites" such as in my opinion, hopefully, allegedly, probably, etc. These expressions are taken as lexical means by which the speaker expresses his/her attitude towards the propositional content of what he/she says. Given that they have the same role as propositional operators, one can predict that they will also be restricted to declarative sentences. This is indeed what is noted by Dik et al. (1990: 54): unlike illocutionary satellites, propositional satellites cannot appear in front of interrogative, imperative and optative clauses, as becomes clear from the contrast between (17a-b) and (18a-b):

(17)  a. Seriously, how do I look?
     b. Honestly, let’s not tell him about it.

= Dik et al.’s (105) and (106)
(18) a. *Hopefully, how do I look?
    b. *Probably, let's not tell him about it.

= Dik et al.'s (107) and (108)

The proposed explanation is: "proposition satellites in general presuppose the speaker's positive commitment to the truth of proposition he presents. These satellites are therefore largely restricted to declarative sentences". To sum up, proposition operators and proposition satellites tend to occur only in declarative sentences.

(e) In fact, not all declarative constructions can be said to embody a proposition. Consider the following sentences:

(19) a. You must leave now.
    b. It's cold in this room.

taken in a context where they are paraphrasable by (20a) and (20b) respectively:

(20) a. Leave!
    b. Close the door, please!

(19a) and (19b) have the form of declarative constructions but convey another illocution than an assertion: they "implicate" an order and a request respectively. Being non-assertive, these two sentences can hardly be said to embody a proposition (in the sense specified above). This is evidenced by the fact that they barely tolerate the occurrence of proposition satellites:

(21) a. ?Probably/?Certainly you must leave now!
    b. ?Probably/?Certainly it's cold in this room!
If this observation is correct, we can hypothesize that the existence of a proposition depends not on the surface form of the expression but on the illocution it conveys. More specifically, the existence of the proposition is connected with the assertive illocution rather than with the declarative sentence type. Nevertheless, for a sentence to be said to embody a proposition, two requirements are to be fulfilled at once: (a) it must convey an assertion and (b) it must have a declarative form. Let us consider, in this respect, sentence (5c), repeated here for convenience:

(5c) Haven’t I given you all my books?!

It is obvious that (5c), despite its interrogative syntactic form, conveys an assertion. Its most appropriate paraphrase is (22):

(22) I have given you all my books.

This property does not, however, enable it to carry a proposition. That this is the case is shown by the fact that propositional satellites are not tolerated. Witness the ungrammaticality of (23):

(23) *Certainly/*Probably/*Surely haven’t I given you all my books?!

(f) In addition to the previous conditions which hold at a sentential level, the occurrence of proposition is subject to a discourse constraint. As I pointed out elsewhere (Moutaoakil 1992), narrative stretches are generally "objective" parts of a text. They are "récits" (in Benveniste’s 1966 sense) involving no "subjective" attitude on the part of any flesh-and-blood
author. This implies that in this type of stretch of discourse
the representational level (i.e. predications as expressions of
SoAs) is involved. By contrast, in those stretches consisting
of author’s interjections (i.e. commentaries, expositions, etc.)
or dialogues, both the interpersonal and the representational
levels are involved. One can therefore expect that only
sentences occurring in non-narrative parts of a text can
embody a propositional layer: "pure" narrative stretches are
sequences of sentences which contain objective descriptions of
SoAs (i.e. predications).

To summarize: not all types of linguistic expressions contain a
proposition. This layer is specific to declarative assertive sentences which
occur in kinds of discourses involving the expression of subjective
attitudes (i.e. conversations, non-narrative parts of a text such as an
author’s interjections, etc.). As far as the FG-style underlying
representation of the clause is concerned, this necessitates the following
amendments:

(i) Only the UCS of those linguistic expressions which actually involve
a proposition may contain a third (i.e. propositional) layer.

(ii) The appearance of this layer is restricted to the UCS of declarative
assertive constructions occurring in a subjectively modalized stretch
of discourse.

(iii) More technically speaking, the specification of the proposition
variable ($X_1$) can be viewed as being triggered by (a) the clausal
operators, i.e. sentence-type operator DECL and illocutionary
operator ASS and (b) an extra-clausal (i.e. textual) operator which
functions to code the type of discourse in which the analysed
linguistic expression occurs. In this connection, one could borrow,
for example, Benveniste’s dichotomy "Récit" vs "Discours", roughly defined as opposing objective discourse to subjective discourse. The textual operators R and D would then indicate that the stretch which falls in their scope is a "Récit" or a "Discours" and that the linguistic expressions it contains may or may not - if they are assertive declaratives - involve a propositional layer. A construction having this property would have, as its UCS, something like (24):

(24) D[DECL ASS E; [X; Proposition]]

The postulation of such a textual operator would not be ad hoc in character since other independent phenomena (including those which relate to implicature, tense, aspect and mood) can receive a fully adequate description only if the type of discourse in which they are involved is taken into account.

3. Clauses without predication

As mentioned above, the predication constitutes the representational level of linguistic expressions. Its main role is to encode a SoA. This is generally assumed to require a full predication consisting of a predicate and a certain number of terms. A closer look at actual data shows, however, that expressions with complete predications or without any predication at all are not rare. My aim in this section is to draw attention to the fact that, at the predicational level too, the current FG-style UCS can hardly be generalized to the underlying representation of all kinds of actual linguistic expressions.
3.1. Full predication

By "full predication", I mean what is called an "extended predication", i.e. the layer consisting of a "core predication" specified by a level-2 operator (tense, objective mood, polarity and external aspect) and (optionally) level-2 satellites. The general format of a full predication can be represented as follows:

(25) \[ \pi_2 e_i; [\pi_1 (\text{Pred arg}^1 \ldots \text{arg}^n)(\sigma_1)(\sigma_2)] \]

According to schema (25), a full predication consists of three hierarchically related sub-structures: (a) a nuclear predication containing a predicate and its associated arguments, (b) a core predication where the predicate operator \(\pi_1\) and the predicate satellites \(\sigma_1\) are specified and (c) an extended predication, the highest predicational layer, arrived at through specification of the predication operator \(\pi_2\) and the predication satellites \(\sigma_2\). This structure as a whole is assumed to encode an SoA, symbolized by the variable \(e_i\). The following sentence is an example of a construction containing a full predication as defined in (25):

(26) Yesterday, John bought a coat for Mary.

In (26), bought is the predicate; John and a coat are its first and second arguments while for Mary and yesterday behave as a predicate satellite and a predication satellite respectively. The predicate operator subsumes the tense feature Past. The UCS of this sentence is, thus, (27):

(27) \[ \text{DECL ASS } E_i; [X_i; \text{Past } e_i; [\text{buy}_v (d1 x_1; \text{John})_{\text{AgSubjTop}}

(i1 x_2; \text{coat})_{\text{GoObj}} (d1 y_1; \text{Mary})_{\text{BenFoc}} (y_2; \text{yesterday})_{\text{Temp}}]] \]

What is noteworthy here is that constructions such as (26) are commonly regarded as the "canonical" expressions of SoAs. This is probably the
reason why grammars (including FG) generally represent the underlying structure of linguistic expressions as embodying a full predication. In fact, constructions with full predication are by no means dominant, as far as everyday verbal exchanges are concerned. Here again type of discourse proves to be an important parameter:

(i) In non-conversational (i.e. narrative, descriptive, expository, etc.) stretches of discourse, we generally find "complete" constructions consisting of a predicate with its arguments and optionally some satellites. This is especially true of the introductory constructions which occur at the beginning of a (narrative, descriptive or expository) text.

(ii) In verbal exchange taking place in a given setting, communication is typically mediated through sentence fragments, i.e. linguistic expressions which do not contain all the elements occurring in full predications. Here are some examples:

(28) A:  a. Who did John buy a coat for?  
        B:  b. For Mary

(29) A:  a. Have you stopped smoking?  
        B:  b. Yes!

(30) Some tea!

(iii) It is not impossible to find full predications in everyday verbal exchanges. However, their occurrence in this type of discourse is highly marked: they are used only when the focus is on the information carried by the predication as a whole. This largely restricts their appearance to contexts where this information is new (i.e. at the very beginning of the verbal exchange) and to those where it is assumed to replace irrelevant information.
(iv) The differences in discourse distribution between full predications and predication fragments can be functionally explained as follows: in normal verbal exchanges, the transmission of a great deal of information is ensured by contextual and/or situational features; therefore, only those pieces of information which are lacking in the previous (linguistic) context and in the situation are to be encoded in linguistic expressions, which may be mere sentence fragments as in (28b), (29b) and (30). In such cases, the use of full sentences is rather inappropriate.

3.2. Predication fragments

Dik (1989: 280) discusses the status and the underlying representation of the sentence fragments occurring in question-answer sequences such as (31a-b) [Dik’s 36]:

(31) a. Where is John going?
   b. To the market.

In fact, the occurrence of sentence fragments is not restricted to question-answer pairs. Reduced sentences can also be questions, or indeed sentence or any sentence type. In this subsection, I will examine the various types of these constructions, focusing on their layering properties.

3.2.1. Questions and answers to questions

According to Dik (1989: 280), the UCS of (31a) and its answer (31b) are (32a) and (32b) respectively:

(32) X: a. INT Ei; [Xi; [Pres ei; [Progr go, (John)Ag, (Qxi)DirFoc]]]
    Y: b. DECL Ei; [Xi; [ei; [d1xi; market]DirFoc]]
Dik (1989:280) comments upon representation (32a) as follows: "(this structure) is meant to express that, although Y only produces the term to the market, this term is nevertheless to be understood as representing a declarative speech act $E_i$, bearing on a proposition $X_i$, specified by an SoA $e_i$, specified by a predication of which only the term to the market is explicit. The rest of that predication can be reconstructed from the context, i.e. from the question posed." As regards the layering properties of UCS like (32b), the following remarks are in order:

(i) The sentence type operator undergoes a change: in (32a-b), for example, the interrogative operator INT is converted into a declarative operator DECL.

(ii) Although the SoA variable $e_i$ remains, predicate operators as well as predication operators are removed.

(iii) If we adopt the hypothesis we argued for in section 2, according to which non-declarative sentences contain no proposition, we must consider that the declarative answer embodies a propositional layer which is lacking in the corresponding question. Thus, (32b) contains a proposition while (32a) should not. Let us now consider the following pair:

(33) A: a. John has bought a coat  
    B: b. For whom?

The underlying structures of (33a) and (33b) are (34a) and (34b) respectively:

(34) a. [DECL ASS $E_i$: $[X_i$: [Past $e_i$: [Perf buy$_V$ (John)$_{Ag}$ (coat)$_{ocd}$]]$_{red}$] 
    b. Int Qu $E_i$: [$e_i$: [(Q$_{x_i}$)$_{loc}$]]
The comparison of these two structures shows that here again the same modifications take place: first, the sentence type operator DECL is replaced by INT and the illocutionary operator Ass(ertive) by Qu(estion); second, unlike (34a), (34b) contains a propositional layer; third, the predication operator Past and the predicate operator Perf disappear while the SoA variable e, remains.

3.2.2. Other predication fragments

Constructions such as (30), repeated here for convenience:

(30) Some tea!

differ from those exemplified in (31b) and (33b) in that their interpretation depends on the information provided only by the discourse situation in which they occur.\(^7\) (30), for instance, may be understood as an order, a request or an offer and may thus have as a possible paraphrase (35a), (35b) or (35c):

(35) a. Give me some tea!
    b. Give me some tea, please!
    c. Have some tea!

On the basis of these three possible interpretations, (30) may have UCS (36a), (36b) or (36c):

\(^7\) Given the modular organization of the MNLU (Model of the Natural Language User), the specification of the situational features may be taken care of by a perceptual module which interacts with the grammatical module.
(36) a. IMP Order E₁: [e₁: [(some tea)GoFoc]]
    b. IMP Req E₁: [e₁: [(some tea)GoFoc]]
    c. IMP Offer E₁: [e₁: [(some tea)GoFoc]]

Notice that here again the predication layer contains no more than a term, i.e. a GoalFocus term. The linguistic expression at hand having no predicate, there is room for neither a predicate operator nor a predication operator.

3.2.3. Grammaticalized predications

Ancient Arab grammarians discuss under the heading "al-?iğrā?" (Incitement) and "at-tahḍīr" (warning) the constructions exemplified in (37) and (38) respectively:

(37) ʔahāka ʔahāka!
      brother-you-acc brother-you-acc
      'Take good care of your brother'

(38) 1-ʔasada 1-ʔasada!
      the-lion-acc the-lion-acc
      'Beware of the lion!'

(37) and (38) are obviously predication fragments: they consist of only a (GoalFocus) term which occurs twice. They differ, however, from the reduced constructions examined above in that they have undergone a grammaticalization process. As a consequence, they are used to express only an incitement or a warning in all contexts. We cannot say, therefore, that in the case of this type of constructions, the rest of the predication (namely the predicate and the level-1 and level-2 operators) is deducible from the (linguistic or situational) context.
3.3. "Pseudo-predications"

With respect to what they can convey, so-called "interjections" may be divided into two main groups: (a) words with a certain lexical meaning and (b) those which have no precise semantic content in themselves. Examples of the former kind of words are:

French:
(39) Chut !

'Sh!'

Arabic:
(40) a. nazāli !

'Get down!'

b. șah !

'Sh!'

Utterances such as (39), and (40a-b) certainly denote an SoA: they express the speaker's order that a certain SoA (i.e. an action) should obtain. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we cannot say that this SoA is mediated through a predication. We can hardly, I think, consider the words constituting such utterances to be predicates. This becomes clear if we take into account the following facts:

(i) It is not clear whether the words in question can be assigned to a precise lexical category.8 Their status as verbs, for example, cannot be established without problems:

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8 There is no agreement in the Arabic grammatical tradition about the lexical category of this kind of word. As reported in Ş-Şuyūṭī (1979), to some grammarians, they are verbs; to others, they are to be regarded as (verbal) nouns or as prepositions; certain grammarians propose to regard them as constituting an independent class of words, called "hawai".
(a) They only can appear in an imperative form:

(41) a. *Je vous ordonne de chuter
    I you order to sh

b. *Je veux que vous chutiez
    I want that you sh

c. *Paul a chuté
    Paul has sh'd

(b) In Arabic where the imperative verb agrees in gender and number with its subject, imperative forms such as (40a-b) do not vary, as becomes clear from the comparison between (42a-d) and (44a-c):

(42) a. uskut !
    sh-MASC-SING
b. uskutī !
    sh-FEM-SING
c. uskutā !
    sh-DUAL
d. uskutū !
    sh-MASC-PLUR
e. uskutna !
    sh-FEM-PLUR

(43) a. *ṣahi
    sh-FEM-SING
b. *ṣahā !
    sh-DUAL
c. *ṣahū !
sh-MASC-PLUR

d. *ṣahna !
sh-FEM-PLUR

(ii) These words do not display the same valency (i.e. argument structure) as the corresponding verbal predicates. In Arabic, for example, ʔāmīn ('Amen') does not take a second argument position (i.e. a Goal argument position) while the corresponding verbs stajib ('fulfil') does:

(44) stajib duʿāʾī!
fulfil supplication-my

(45) *ʔāmīn duʿāʾī!

(iii) Unlike ordinary predicates, the words at hand are excluded from derivational processes: on the one hand, they obviously do not result from the application of any predicate formation rule; on the other hand, they generally are not used as input to any such rule.

These observations are sufficient, it seems to me, to conclude that utterances such as (39) and (40a-b) denote an SoA but do not consist of real predications, at least to the extent that these structures are conceived of as resulting from the association of a certain number of terms to some (verbal, nominal or adjectival) predicate. Having no appropriate label to refer to this kind of utterances, let us provisionally call them "pseudo-predications". Other examples of pseudo-predications are interjections in French such as eh, oh and parbleu, in the sense that they clearly do not conform to the standard form of a predication. They thus resemble, in this respect, the utterances exemplified in (39) and (40a-b). However, they display, as mentioned above, the distinguishing property of having
no specific semantic content. This means that they do not denote a SoA, which implies that they do have not any propositional content, the presence of a proposition within a linguistic expression depending on whether this expression designates an SoA. In fact, the interjections under examination are generally not used to express the speaker’s attitude towards an SoA. This is the case, for example, for French interjections such as parbleu, whose main function is to express the speaker’s approval of some SoA. It should be noticed, as a specific property of these words, that the SoA to which they relate is located outside the linguistic expression in which they appear, i.e. in the previous (linguistic) context or in the discourse situation. This becomes clear from the following exchange:

(46) A: a.   Est-ce que Marie peut venir dîner ce soir?

   ‘Can Marie come for dinner tonight?’

B: b.   Parbleu!

   ‘Sure!’

In (46) parbleu expresses B’s approval vis-à-vis the SoA indicated in (46a) but does not designate any SoA in itself. So (46b) functions as a mere subjective modality with respect to the content of (46a).

Notice, as a general remark, that interjections involve an illocutionary force even if they have no specifiable inherent semantic content. For example, (39) is an imperative utterance conveying an order while (46b) is a (declarative) assertion.

In sum, interjections with a specified semantic content, although they do not constitute real predications, do denote an SoA (frequently an Action or a Process); those word-utterances to which no specifiable inherent meaning can be associated cannot be said, in the most frequent

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⁹ Recall that a proposition can be said to be true or false, as Dik (1989:248) points out, "in relation to the occurrence of some SoA in some world".
cases, to represent any SoA and function, consequently, as subjective modalities with respect to an SoA involved in the (linguistic or situational) context. On the basis of these observations, one can postulate, as general UCS formats, (47) for the former kind of interjections and (48) for the latter:

(47) \( \pi \varepsilon E \): [e: [Pseudo-predication]]

(48) \( \pi \varepsilon E \): [Pseudo-predication]

4. Conclusions

This study permits us, it seems to me, to draw a number of conclusions regarding the layering of the underlying representation as conceived of in the current theory of FG.

Sentence type and (basic/implicated) illocution are quite distinct features although they interplay in determining the formal (i.e. morphosyntactic and prosodic) properties of linguistic expressions as well as their interpretation. They must appear in the UCS, therefore as two different elements represented by two distinct devices. This can be taken care of by an additional clausal operator which may be conceived of as belonging to the same layer as the illocutionary operator (i.e. the fourth layer) or as part of a higher layer. In the former case, the layering of the UCS would remain the same; in the latter, a fifth layer would be added.

As it stands, the current representation of UCS which consists of an illocution, a proposition, an extended predication and a core predication can be said to be appropriate only when it applies to declarative assertive clauses with full predications. It overshoots the mark in other kinds of linguistic expressions, namely:

(i) non-declarative non-assertive constructions which, by virtue of their nature, involve no proposition;
(ii) fragmentary predications and pseudo-predications in which there is no room for the specification of level-1 and level-2 operators;

(iii) pseudo-predications which cannot be said to embody any SoA.

Such a representation, when generalized to all types of linguistic expressions, contravenes two of the most important theoretical requirements:

(a) that only the elements involved in the production or the interpretation of linguistic expressions are to be represented (i.e. the psychological requirement);

(b) and that in a level of representation, only the information necessitated by the rules taking it as input can appear (i.e. the economy requirement).

In order to avoid this problem, one can envisage two possibilities: first, to postulate a specific UCS for each construction type examined; second, to adopt the current general format of UCS, but marking as optional the elements which are not required in all cases (e.g. by placing them between brackets). In general, whichever solution is chosen, an optimally adequate underlying representation requires that the analysed linguistic expression should be approached as part of a discourse.
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