The hierarchical structure of the clause and the typology of perception verb complements
Simon C. Dik & Kees Hengeveld
University of Amsterdam
THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF THE CLAUSE
AND THE TYPOLOGY OF PERCEPTION VERB COMPLEMENTS

Simon C. Dik
Institute for General Linguistics
University of Amsterdam
Spuistraat 210
1012 VT Amsterdam

Kees Hengeveld
Department of Spanish
University of Amsterdam
Spuistraat 134
1012 VB Amsterdam
Abstract

In this paper it is argued that the differences between perception verb complements can be understood in terms of the hierarchical clause structure used in FG to represent utterances. The different layers of this structure, in combination with the appropriate operators, constitute a typology of complements, which, applied to the complements of perception verbs, yields a description of these complements which accounts for the many subtle semantic differences between them.
0. Introduction

Recent developments in Functional Grammar (FG, Dik 1978, 1989, Hengeveld 1989), in particular the adoption of a layered clause model, have created new possibilities for the analysis of complements. This paper explores these possibilities and then goes on to study a particularly interesting group of complements: those which occur with perception verbs. Perception verbs often allow several types of complement (e.g. finite and non-finite), with corresponding differences in meaning and use. These differences will be interpreted in terms of the layered approach to clause-structure.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 gives a brief sketch of the hierarchical sentence model as developed within FG and shows its general implications for the treatment of complements. In section 2 a typology of complements based on the layered clause model is proposed. In section 3 we turn our attention to the complements of perception verbs, and try to interpret the differences between these complements in...
1. The hierarchical structure of utterances

Hengeveld (1988, 1989, fc.a) and Dik (1989) propose to represent utterances by means of a multi-layered hierarchical clause model, the general format of which is given in (1):

(1) \[ \text{THE REPRESENTATION OF UTTERANCES} \]

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_1 \text{ Predicate operators} & & \pi_3 \text{ Proposition operators} \\
\pi_2 \text{ Predication operators} & & \pi_4 \text{ Illocution operators}
\end{align*}
\]

The model in (1) consists of two levels, each containing several layers. The higher level is called the interpersonal level, as it is concerned with those linguistic means which are used by the speaker to evoke a certain communicative effect in the addressee. The lower level is called the representational level, as it is concerned with those linguistic means which are used by the speaker to provide the addressee with a description of a state of affairs. The higher level is structured on the basis of an abstract illocutionary frame, which specifies relations between a speaker (S), an addressee (A) and the communicated message unit or content (X). The lower level is structured on the basis of a predicate frame, which specifies a property of an individual or a
Perception verb complements

relation between several individuals (x). Starting from the outermost layer the schema in (1) states that within a speech act (E) a propositional content (X) is communicated, within which reference is made to a state of affairs (e) in which some individuals (x) participate. Thus the following layers, each provided with their own variable, can be distinguished. The general format of these layers is the one proposed for terms in Dik (1978) and for predications in Vet (1986). All variables are followed by restrictors of decreasing complexity, which contain the main information on their respective layers:

(2) LAYERS
Clause: 
\( (E_1: [\text{ILL} (S) (A) (X_1: \text{etc.} (X_1))] (E_1)) \)
Proposition: 
\( (X_1: [(e_1: \text{etc.} (e_1))] (X_1)) \)
Predication: 
\( (e_1: [\text{Pred}_\beta (x_1)^n] (e_1)) \)
Term: 
\( (x_1: \text{Pred}_N (x_1)) \)

Each layer can be modified by operators, as is indicated in (1). Operators capture semantic distinctions which are expressed by grammatical rather than lexical means. Apart from term operators (see Rijkhoff fc.), the following classes of operators can be distinguished:

Predicate operators \( (\pi_1) \) capture the grammatical means which specify additional properties of the set of SoAs designated by a bare predication. These additional properties may concern the internal temporal constituency (Comrie 1976) of the SoA (Qualificational Aspect) and the presence or absence of the property or relation expressed by the predicate (Predicate negation).

Predication operators \( (\pi_2) \) capture the grammatical means which locate the SoA designated by a predication in a real or imaginary world and thus restrict the set of potential referents of the predication to the external situation(s) the

\[ \text{The } n \text{ in this formula indicates that a predication may contain more than one term}. \]
speaker has in mind. This restricting function may concern the time of occurrence of the SoA (Tense), the frequency of occurrence of the SoA (Quantificational Aspect), and the actuality of occurrence of the SoA (Objective mood (Realis-Irrealis), Polarity).

Proposition operators ($\pi_3$) capture the grammatical means through which the speaker specifies his attitude towards the (truth of the) propositional content he puts forward for consideration. The speaker may do so by specifying the source of the propositional content (Evidential mood) or by specifying his personal assessment of the propositional content (Subjective mood).

Illocution operators ($\pi_4$) capture the grammatical means through which the speaker modifies the force of the basic illocution of his utterance so as to make it fit his communicative strategy. The speaker may do so by mitigating the force of the speech act (Mitigating mode) or by reinforcing it (Reinforcing mode).

Distinctions quite similar to those expressed by operators can be expressed by lexical means, i.e. adverbial constructions, in which case they are treated as satellites operating at a particular layer (see Dik et al. fc.).

Every layer designates an entity of a different order (cf. Lyons 1977:442-7). A (set or ensemble of) individual(s) is a first order entity. It can be located in space, and can be evaluated in terms of its existence. A state of affairs is a second order entity. It can be located in space and time, and can be evaluated in terms of its reality. A propositional content is a third order entity. It can be located in space nor time, and can be evaluated in terms of its truth. A speech act is a fourth order entity. It locates itself in space and time, and can be evaluated in terms of its felicity (Austin 1962). Of particular importance is the distinction made here between propositional contents and states of affairs. Lyons notes that, unlike states of affairs, propositional contents can be asserted, known, denied, or questioned, i.e. "... are
entities of the kind that may function as the objects of such so-called propositional attitudes as belief, expectation and judgement" (ibid.:445), which shows that the two have to be distinguished.

The distinction between propositional contents, or potential facts, and states of affairs can already be found in Vendler’s (1967) pioneering paper on ‘facts and events’. Vendler starts from the following examples, which had figured in a philosophical discussion between J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson:

(3)a. The collapse of the Germans was an event.
   b. The collapse of the Germans was a fact.

Against Strawson, who maintained that "facts are not in the world", Austin argues that if X is an event, and events are in the world, and X is also a fact, then one cannot say that facts are NOT in the world.

What Vendler demonstrates, however, is that the same expression the collapse of the Germans may designate different things, and does designate different things in (3). He does so by showing that a context such as ‘... was an event’ accepts a different class of subjects than the context ‘... was a fact’, although there is a certain amount of overlap, as in (3). An event-context requires event-complements (where event includes processes and actions, in other words Vendler’s ‘event’ equals our ‘state of affairs’), while a fact-context requires fact-complements. In the conclusion to his paper Vendler takes the following position with respect to first-order, second-order, and third-order entities: first-order entities (his ‘objects’) are primarily in space, secondarily in time; second-order entities (his ‘events’) are primarily in time, secondarily in space; third-order entities (his ‘facts’) are neither in space nor in time.
2. Complementation

The representation in (1) tries to capture the structure of simple clauses, i.e. clauses in which all argument and satellite positions are filled with terms with a nominal head, most of which refer to first order entities. In order to account for complex clauses one has to allow for arguments and satellites which themselves can be analysed as complex structures referring to higher order entities. The question that arises here is what kind of structure it is that occupies an argument or satellite slot in a complex clause.

In Hengeveld (1988, 1989, fc.b), Dik (1989), Bolkestein (fc.) it is argued, in line with Foley & Van Valin (1985) and Lehmann (1988) (i) that each layer (including all layers of lower complexity it contains) may be turned into the complement of a matrix predicate, (ii) that the particular layer chosen is dependent upon the class of matrix predicates involved, and (iii) that differences between complement types can be accounted for in terms of the differences between the layers underlying them. Thus predicate frames would be of the following general format:

\[ \text{Pred}_B \ldots (\alpha_1) \ldots \]

where \( \alpha \) is a variable ranging over \( x, e, X \) and \( E \). Consider the following Nama examples (Khoisan, Hagman 1974, Rust 1965):

(5) 'Oo-s ke //'īisà //xaápá kē míí
    then-3sg Decl she again Rem.past say
    /'ūū-ta 'a tí
    not.know-lsg Pres Quote
    'She said again: "I don't know"'

3 For a general view of the treatment of embedded constructions see Dik (fc.a).
Utterance predicates used for direct speech reports, as in (5), have a fourth order complement, the quoted speech act. In Nama these predicates take a finite complement provided with the quote-particle ti. Belief predicates, as in (6), have a third order argument, the believed propositional content. In Nama these predicates may take finite complements provided with the complementizer !xáisà. Commentative predicates, such as !gomba 'difficult' in (7) have a second order argument, the state of affairs commented upon. In Nama these predicates take complements nominalized by means of the suffix -s.

On the basis of the layers available (1) and listed in (2) three types of complement can be postulated:

(8) COMPLEMENT TYPES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(E₁: Clause (E₁))</td>
<td>Speech Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X₁: Proposition (X₁))</td>
<td>Propositional Content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e₁: Predication (e₁))</td>
<td>State of Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This classification accounts for many differences between complements, such as those illustrated by means of the Nama examples, but also leaves several facts unexplained. Consider for instance the following pairs of Spanish examples:
Antonio no se daba cuenta que
Antonio didn’t realize that he was / would be ill

(9) Antonio no creía que
Antonio didn’t believe that he was / would be ill

In Spanish, complements of semi-factive predicates such as darse cuenta ‘realize’ (lit. ‘give oneself account’) never occur with a subjunctive verb form. The complements of non-factive predicates, such as creer ‘believe’, may occur with both the indicative and the subjunctive. Within such complements the speaker may choose whether he wants to commit himself to the truth of the complement, in which case he uses the indicative, or does not want to commit himself to the truth of the complement, in which case he uses the subjunctive. In the case of semi-factive predicates the speaker has already made this choice when selecting the semi-factive predicate, which forces him to commit himself to the truth of the complement. Similar examples could have been given for French and Italian.

These and comparable differences between complements can be accounted for when operators are taken into account in the classification of complements (cf. Hengeveld 1988, fc.a, Dik fc.b). A distinction can be made between a layer + the full set of operators corresponding to that layer on the one hand, and a layer + the obligatory application of a single operator on the other. In the case of the semi-factive and

4 Factive predicates presuppose the occurrence of the state of affairs described in the complement, semi-factive predicates presuppose the commitment of the speaker to the truth of the complement, non-factive predicates carry neither of these presuppositions.
non-factive predicates exemplified above the complement of the non-factive predicate creer has a position for proposition operators for which the speaker can make his own selection, whereas the complement of the semi-factive predicate darse cuenta has a prepared operator position which contains a Certainty operator, as listed in (11):

(11)  
\[
\text{darse\_cuenta}_v (x_1)_{\text{Po}} (\text{Cert} \ x_1)_{\text{Go}} \\
\text{creer}_v (x_1)_{\text{Po}} (\pi_3 \ x_1)_{\text{Go}}
\]

The distinction between complements in which there is a free choice of operators and complements in which the choice of operators is predetermined by the matrix predicate leads to a large number of different complement-types. In the following overview the complement type is given in the first column and the class of matrix predicates (as listed in Noonan 1985) which takes this kind of complement in the second column:

(12)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complement</th>
<th>Matrix predicate class (Cf. Noonan 1985)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(E_1)</td>
<td>Utterance (Direct Speech)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\pi_3 \ x_1)</td>
<td>Utterance (Indirect Speech), Pretence, Propositional attitude, Fearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{Cert} \ x_1)</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{Des} \ x_1)</td>
<td>Desiderative (Hoping and Wishing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\pi_2 \ e_1)</td>
<td>Commentative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{Sim} \ e_1)</td>
<td>Immediate perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{Subs} \ e_1)</td>
<td>Desiderative (Wanting), Manipulative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cert=Certainty       Sim=Simultaneous
Des=Desiderative     Subs=Subsequent.

---

5 The matrix predicate classes listed in Noonan not included here are: Modal, Achievement, Phasal, Negative and Conjunctive predicates.

3. Complements of perception verbs

3.1. Overview

In many languages the complements of perception verbs may take different forms, with corresponding differences in meaning. There are four different readings of perception verbs and their complements which have to be distinguished. These different readings can be interpreted in terms of the kind of entity that the complement refers to. We will first give a brief overview of the different possibilities, and then give some facts which support the distinctions made.

3.1.1. Immediate perception of individual

The first reading concerns the immediate perception of one individual by another, as is illustrated in:

(13) I saw your brother last night

In this example the verb see specifies a relation between the perceiving first order entity I and the perceived first order entity your brother, which are both individuals, i.e. touchable, locatable entities.

The predicate frame for perception verbs in this reading is given in (14), where PERCEIVE represents any perception verb:

(14) PERCEIVE (x₁)ₚₑᵣᵱₑ (x₂)₝ₒ
3.1.2. Immediate perception of state of affairs

The second reading concerns the immediate perception of a state of affairs by an individual, which is illustrated in (15):

(15) I saw him walk down the street

In these examples the verb see specifies a relation between the perceiving first order entity I, an individual, and the perceived second order entity (him) walk down the street, a state of affairs.

The predicate frame for perception verbs in this reading is:

(16) PERCEIVE (x₁)_{Proc} (Sim e₁)Go

where the temporal operator Sim on e₁ indicates that the state of affairs described in the complement has to be interpreted as simultaneous with the state of affairs described in the matrix predication.

3.1.3. Mental perception of propositional content

The third reading concerns the acquisition of knowledge through one of the senses by an individual, which is illustrated in:

(17) I saw that Mary had been crying

In this example the verb see specifies a relation between the perceiving first order entity I, an individual, and the acquired third order entity Mary has been crying, a
propositional content.

The predicate frame for perception verbs in the MP readings is:

(18) \text{PERCEIVE} (x_1)_{\text{Proc}} (\text{Cert } x_1)_{\text{Go}}

3.1.4. Reception of the propositional content of a speech act

The fourth reading occurs with predicates of hearing and seeing (in the sense of 'reading') only, and concerns the reception of the content of a speech act by an individual, which is illustrated in:

(19) I hear you will probably sing in the Royal Albert Hall
next week

In this example the verb hear specifies a relation between the receiving first order entity I, an individual, and the received third order entity you will probably sing in the Royal Albert Hall, a propositional content brought forward by a third party.

The predicate frame for perception verbs in this reading is:

(20) \text{PERCEIVE} (x_1)_{\text{Proc}} (\pi_3 x_1)_{\text{Go}}

3.1.5. Summing up

The following types of perception and their corresponding predicate frames can be distinguished:
(i) Immediate perception of individual (IPI)
PERCEIVE \( x_1 \) _Proc \( x_2 \) _Go

(ii) Immediate perception of state of affairs (IPSoA)
PERCEIVE \( x_1 \) _Proc \( \text{Sim} e_1 \) _Go

(iii) Mental perception of propositional content (MP)
PERCEIVE \( x_1 \) _Proc \( \text{Cert} x_1 \) _Go

(iv) Reception of propositional content of speech act (RP)
PERCEIVE \( x_1 \) _Proc \( \pi_3 x_1 \) _Go

In the following sections we will discuss these constructions two by two. In each case we will first discuss the differences between the constructions, then give some examples of languages which make some formal distinction between the two constructions, and finally provide FG representations which capture the observed differences. The pairs of constructions are discussed in the following way:

Immediate perception of individual (IPI)  
Immediate perception of state of affairs (IPSoA)  
Mental perception of propositional content (MP)  
Reception of propositional content of speech act (RP)

3.2. Immediate perception of state of affairs vs. Mental perception of propositional content

The contrast between the IPSoA and MP readings of perception verbs has attracted the attention of many linguists. It is this difference in meaning that is often coded in different construction types. The distinction corresponds to what is often called 'immediate' or 'direct' perception vs. 'indirect' perception, but what we will call here immediate perception of state of affairs (IPSoA) vs. mental perception (MP).

For a correct interpretation of this terminology, it
is important to note that two subtypes of mental perception have to be distinguished, primary and secondary mental perception. In this respect Barwise and Perry (1983: 194), following Dretske (1969), note with respect to visual perception: 'In general see,-reports (see with a that-clause complement, SCD/KH) describe acquisition of knowledge through perception. A primary see,-report is one that reports a direct acquisition of knowledge via perception. A secondary report is one that reports an acquisition of knowledge based on perception augmented by what one knows must be the case based on what one sees'. They then give the following examples to illustrate the two readings:

(21) (a) I saw that the tree was whipping around, (b) so I saw that the wind was blowing.
(22) (a) Sue saw that Tanner Library was empty, (b) so she saw that Helen was not in the library.'

In the most natural readings of (21)-(22) the a sentences describe primary, the b sentences secondary mental perception. Thus, primary mental perception concerns the acquisition of knowledge based on immediate perception, but this is not the same as immediate perception as such.

There is reason to assume, as we hope to show, that in the case of immediate perception the complement has the status of a predication, designating a state of affairs (a second order entity), whereas in the case of mental perception the complement has the status of a proposition, designating a possible fact (a third order entity)."
3.2.1. Differences between IPSoA- and MP-constructions

There are many differences in the behaviour of IPSoA- and MP-constructions:

(i) IPSoA-constructions require simultaneity of the complement state of affairs with the main clause state of affairs,' MP-constructions do not:

(23) We saw him leave/leaving (IPSoA)
(24) *We saw him have left/having left
(25) We saw that he had left (MP)

The same requirement is reflected in the impossibility of adding temporal satellites to the complement in IPSoA-constructions. In the following sentences the satellites can only be interpreted as modifying the main clause:

(26) I heard Sally recite a poem yesterday
(27) At the same moment he heard a man entering the room

(ii) IPSoA-constructions require the complement states of affairs to be perceivable, MP-constructions do not:

(28) *We saw the discussion be/being useless
(29) We saw that the discussion was useless

Correspondingly, MP-constructions may occur with a complement only the visual experience is relevant. This characterization of the difference between the two constructions is compatible with our distinction between potential facts and states of affairs.

This requirement makes the present participle, which indicates simultaneity, very suitable for the expression of immediate perception (cf. Noonan 1985:109).
concerning something which is missing:

(30) We saw that one chair was missing
(31) *We saw one chair miss/missing

(iii) As a more specific instantiation of the preceding restriction, IPSoA-constructions do not allow the complement to be negated independently, whereas MP-constructions do allow this type of negation:

(32)a He didn’t see the girl cry/crying
    b *He saw the girl not cry/crying
    c *He didn’t see the girl not cry/crying
(33)a He didn’t see that the girl cried
    b He saw that the girl didn’t cry
    c He didn’t see that the girl didn’t cry

(iv) There is an important difference between IPSoA-constructions and MP-constructions even in those cases in which the state of affairs described in the complement is (i) simultaneous with the state of affairs described in the main clause, (ii) perceivable, and (iii) positive. This difference has to do with the factivity of the constructions. IPSoA-constructions are non-factive, MP-constructions are semi-factive, i.e. the speaker presupposes the truth of the complement in MP-constructions, whereas he does not in IPSoA-constructions. Compare the continuations of (34) and (35):

(34) I didn’t see Sally crying (and I know that she wasn’t)
(35) I didn’t see that Sally was crying (*and I know that she wasn’t)

This important semantic difference between the two constructions is due to the fact that the perception verb in (35) describes the way the speaker acquired the knowledge described in the complement, whereas in (34) it describes
perception as such. This difference is also reflected in the possible paraphrases of see in the two readings involved. The predicate in (35) can be paraphrased as 'realize', whereas the predicate in (34) can be paraphrased as 'watch':

(36) I didn’t watch Sally crying
(37) *I didn’t watch that Sally was crying
(38) *I didn’t realize Sally crying
(39) I didn’t realize that Sally was crying

Given these paraphrase possibilities one expects, in those languages in which MP and IPSoA are coded in different constructions, MP-constructions to make use of the expression format which is also used with other predicates of knowledge or acquisition of knowledge. Noonan (1985:130-1) presents some facts to show just this. In English too this situation obtains: MP-constructions make use of that-complements and acc-cum-inf complements, just as knowledge predicates do:

In this respect Barwise & Perry (1983:179) give the following elaborate example: 'If you, as special prosecutor, had to convince a jury that Nixon saw Rosemary Woods erase the crucial part of the Watergate tape, you would have a pretty good idea of the sort of evidence you would need. You would need to prove that Rosemary Woods did indeed erase the crucial part of the tape and that Nixon saw it. For example, a film of Nixon watching Miss Woods erase that part of the tape would be pretty good evidence. But what if you had to prove that Nixon saw that Rosemary Woods erased the crucial part of the Watergate tape? Your old evidence will no longer suffice, since Nixon could claim that he didn’t know it was the Watergate tape, or that he didn’t know that she was erasing it, or that he knew that she was erasing it but didn’t know it was the crucial part. To prove the first (and weaker) claim, one has to show that Nixon had his eyes open and functioning, and that an event of a certain sort was taking place before him. To prove the stronger claim, one needs to prove something about what he recognized and what thoughts were going through his mind.'
Kirsner & Thompson (1976), in discussing examples (40a-b) note that these constitute "an indirect report about, or a deducing of, a situation", rather than direct perception.

3.2.2. The expression of IPSoA- and MP-constructions

The distinction between IPSoA- and MP-constructions is reflected in the different forms that these constructions may take in many languages. The differences in form may concern (i) the complement type, in particular the form of the complement predicate, (ii) the complementizer.

3.2.2.1. Different complement types

In FIJIAN (Austronesian, Dixon 1988) perception verbs may take either a nominalized complement, as in (42), or a finite complement, as in (43):

(42) au aa rogo-ca a o-dra qaaqaa a cauravou yai
     1sg Past hear-Tr Art Cl-3pl win Art youth Dem
     'I heard these youths’ winning'

(43) au aa rogo-ca ni=ra qaaqaa a cauravou yai
     1sg Past hear-Tr Comp=3pl win Art youth Dem
     'I heard that these youths had won'

According to Dixon (1988: 38, 268) the first sentence 'implies that I listened to a commentary over the radio', whereas the second sentence 'implies that I just heard the result', which can be interpreted as a difference between immediate and non-
immediate perception. In the first case the complement takes
the form of a nominalization, introduced by the article a, in
the second case the complement is introduced by the
complementizer ni.

In MODERN GREEK (Indo-European, Joseph & Philippaki-
Warburton 1987) perception verbs may take either an indicative
or a subjunctive complement. The difference between the two
complement types becomes apparent in negative contexts, as is
illustrated in the following examples, taken from Joseph &
Philippaki-Warburton (1987):

(44) den ton ída na koli(m)bá
    Neg 3sg.Acc see.1sg.Past Sub swim.3sg.Pres
    'I didn’t see him swim'
(45) den ton ída óti koli(m)búse
    Neg 3sg.Acc see.1sg.Past Comp swim.3sg.Impf.Past
    'I didn’t see that he was swimming'

Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987:182) note that in (44)
'the implication is that he may have swum but he may have
not', whereas in (45) 'the implication is that he did swim but
the act was not witnessed by the speaker'. This suggests that
in (44) the immediate perception of the swimming event by the
speaker is negated (and therefore it may or may not have
happened as far as the speaker is concerned), whereas in (45)
it is negated that the speaker acquired the knowledge
concerning the swimming event through the visual channel. Like
other predicates designating acquisition of knowledge, the
perception verb is semi-factive under the second reading.

The MP use of perception verbs with indicative
complements is further corroborated by the fact that this
construction type can be used for the description of
acquisition of knowledge through one of the senses concerning
a non-perceivable state of affairs, as in:
'He felt that the discussion was useless'

3.2.2.2. Different complementizers

Complements of matrix verbs in JAPANESE (Altaic, Kuno 1973) can take three 'complementizers': no, koto, and to. There is a grammatical distinction between no/koto on the one hand, and to on the other: the former turn the complement into a nominal term, which then takes the postpositions usual for such terms. To does not have this nominalizing effect. Compare:

(47) John wa nihongo ga muzukasii to itta
    John Top Japanese Subj difficult TO said
    'John said that Japanese is difficult'

(48) Watakusi wa nihongo ga muzukasii koto o
    I Top Japanese Subj difficult KOTO Obj
    mananda
    learned
    'I learned that Japanese is difficult'

(49) Watakusi wa John ga Mary o butu no o mita
    I Top John Subj Mary Obj hit NO Obj saw
    'I saw John hit Mary'

Thus, to is similar to a subordinator such as that in English, whereas no/koto behave like head nouns specified by the full preceding clause. (48) could be paraphrased as: 'I learned the fact defined by Japanese being difficult', and (49) as: 'I saw the event consisting of John hitting Mary'.

The complementizing elements in (47)-(49) cannot be substituted for one another. In other occurrences two or even all three of them may occur, but with concomitant semantic differences. This, plus the paraphrases given above, already
suggests that different semantic complementation types are involved. The basic differences in meaning and usage between the three elements are described by Kuno (1973) as follows: no is used for representing concrete events which can be perceived by the senses; koto is used for "nominalizing a proposition and forming an abstract concept out of the proposition" (ibid. 221), and in most of its occurrences it is associated with a factive presupposition; to "was originally a particle for reporting someone else's statement" (ibid. 215), and it is used to represent a propositional content without committing the speaker in any way to the truth of that content. In cases where an opposition with koto is possible, the usage of to strongly suggests that the propositional content might not be/come true.

In terms of the distinctions made in this paper, we may hypothesize that the three elements basically signal the following elements:

(50) NO (Sim e)  
     KOTO (Cert X)  
     TO (π₃ X)

Especially no and koto almost literally 'spell out' the variables e and X, which are then specified by the whole embedded predication and proposition respectively.

Immediate perception verbs in Japanese take no-complements, as in (49) above, and in the following examples:

(51) Watakusi wa John ga piano o hiku no o kiita  
     I Top John Subj piano Obj play NO Obj heard  
     'I heard John play(ing) the piano'
Watakusi wa sesuzi ga samuku naru no o
I Top spine Subj cold get NO Obj
kanzita
felt
'I felt my spine getting cold’ =
'I felt a cold shiver running down my spine’

Kuno adds, however, that sentence (51) with koto "would be acceptable, but it would no longer be a statement of perception by any of the five senses: it would mean: "I heard that John plays the piano". Similarly, kanziru "to feel" can take a koto clause, but then it would mean no longer "to feel by five senses", but "to think"." (ibid. 220). It is clear that we would interpret such cases as examples of mental perception, where the perception verb takes a propositional complement. This is fully consistent with the interpretation of the three complementizing elements given in (50) above.

Noonan (1985:131) notes that in RUSSIAN the complements of perception verbs may occur with two different complementizers:

(53) Ja videl kak Boris čitaet knigu
 lsg saw Comp Boris read.Ind book
 'I saw Boris reading a book’

(54) Ja videl čto Boris čitaet knigu
 lsg saw Comp Boris read.Ind book
 'I saw that Boris read a book’

In both cases the complement contains a finite indicative verb form. In the first sentence, with the complementizer kak, the main predicate designates IPSoA, in the second sentence, with the complementizer čto, it designates MP.
3.2.3. The representation of IPSoA- and MP-constructions

We have given a preliminary representation of perception verbs in their IPSoA- and MP-readings. More elaborate representations, including the internal structure of the complements, are given here. We will start with IPSoA:

(55) IMMEDIATE PERCEPTION OF STATE OF AFFAIRS:
PERCEIVE (x_1)_{Proc} (SimPos e_1: [π₁ Pred_B (x_1) ... (x_n)] (e_1))_{Go}

This representation accounts for the fact that the complement cannot be specified independently for tense and negation, since the fixed operators for Simultaneity (Sim) and Positive polarity (Pos) block specification of other temporal and polar operators. The underlying structure of the complement predicts, however, that π₁ operators can be expressed within the complement. That this is indeed the case can be derived from the following examples, discussed in Kirsner & Thompson (1976):

(56) I heard Sally recite a poem
(57) I heard Sally reciting a poem

Kirsner & Thompson’s hypothesis is that the infinitival complement signals ‘SoA is Bounded in Time’ (circumscribed), whereas the participial complement signals ‘SoA is Not Bounded in Time’ (not circumscribed). We interpret this difference in terms of Perfective (= Bounded) and Imperfective (= Unbounded) aspect. The following representation can thus be given for

Although K&T avoid the terms Perfective (Bounded) and Imperfective (Unbounded) for fear of equivocation, their characterization of the relevant difference is fully compatible with that aspectual distinction, if taken in the sense of, e.g., Comrie (1976). Comrie does indeed discuss the difference between (56) and (57) in terms of Perfective - Imperfective.
It is not immediately clear from the underlying representation of IPSoA-constructions why it is that temporal satellites cannot be added to the complement, since the position needed for these satellites is available in underlying structure. The solution we think should be given to this problem is that the operator for simultaneousness blocks the insertion of temporal satellites: a temporal satellite designating a non-simultaneous interval would contradict the Sim operator; a temporal satellite designating a simultaneous interval would be redundant. Compare:

(59)  *I hear [Sally recite a poem three hours ago]  
      (incompatible)
(60)  *I hear [Sally recite a poem at this very moment]  
      (redundant)

In other cases too the selection of temporal satellites has to be made dependent upon the tense operator, e.g. in order to avoid the combination of a future tense with the adverb yesterday. Satellites of level 2 cannot be categorically excluded, since locative (61) and quantificational (62) satellites can be added to the complement without any problem:

(61)  I heard Sally recite a poem in the bathroom
(62)  I heard Sally recite a poem repeatedly

Note that these sentences are ambiguous, since the satellites in these examples can also be interpreted as modifying the main clause.
MP-constructions can be represented in the following way:

(63) MENTAL PERCEPTION:
PERCEIVE \((x_1)_{\text{Proc}} \text{Cert } X_1: [\pi_2 \epsilon_1: [\pi_1 \text{Pred}_B (x_1)_n (\epsilon_1))] (X_I))_{\text{Go}}\)

The fixed operator for Certainty accounts for the semi-factive nature of perception verbs in this reading. This can once more be illustrated by means of the following examples:

(64) I hear that he had sung (e.g. I deduced this from his hoarse voice)
(65) I didn't hear that he had sung (but now I know he had)

The underlying structure of the complement predicts that \(\pi_2\) operators (e.g. for tense and negation) can be expressed within the complement. That this is indeed the case can be derived from:

(66) I heard that he would sing (e.g. I deduced this from his clearing his throat)
(67) I heard that he hadn't sung (e.g. I deduced this from his voice not being hoarse)

The following underlying structure may be assumed for (64):

(68) \(\text{Hear}_V (x_i: I (x_i))_{\text{Proc}} \text{Cert } X_I: [\text{Past } \epsilon_i: \text{[Pf Sing}_V (x_j: \text{he (x_j)}_{\text{Ag}}] (\epsilon_i))] (X_I))_{\text{Go}}\)

The representation of MP-constructions also makes clear why it is that the states of affairs in their complements need not be perceivable: it is not the state of affairs itself, but the proposition concerning this state of affairs that is (mentally) perceived. The perceivability of the state of affairs that this proposition has a bearing on is
immaterial.

3.3. Mental perception of propositional content vs. Reception of the propositional content of a speech act

The difference between Mental perception of a propositional content (MP) and Reception of the propositional content of a speech act (RP) is less clearcut than the previous one. MP and RP differ in that in the case of RP the perceived entity is of a linguistic nature, whereas in the case of MP it is not. Consider the following example:

(69) I hear that Jane has caught a cold

This sentence may be interpreted in two ways: (i) the speaker deduces Jane’s having caught a cold from e.g. the sound of her voice. In this case the sentence can be paraphrased as ‘I infer that Jane has caught a cold’; (ii) the speaker has been told by someone else that Jane has caught a cold. In this case the sentence can be paraphrased as ‘I’ve been told that Jane has caught a cold’. Replacement of the complement by a noun phrase like ‘the news’, as in ‘I’ve heard the news’ is only possible under the second reading (Cf. Holierhoek 1980:45). Under the first interpretation (69) is a MP-construction, under the second interpretation it is a RP-construction. In both cases the complement represents a propositional content, but in the first case this propositional content originates with the speaker, whereas in the second case it originates with someone else. It is this distinguishing feature that is responsible for the differences between the two constructions. RP-constructions are possible with predicates of hearing and seeing (the latter only in the sense of ‘reading’, as in (71) below). MP-constructions are possible with all perception verbs.
3.3.1. Differences between MP- and RP-constructions

Since in both the MP- and the RP-construction the complement is a proposition, coding differences are less likely to occur. Nevertheless there are some differences which justify a separate treatment of the two constructions.

(i) In RP-constructions the original speaker or a written source can be specified as the source of the propositional content (Cf. Holierhoek 1980:86-8):

(70) I heard from John that Peter had been fighting
(71) I saw in the newspaper that Peter had been fighting

In the MP-construction the source of inference of the propositional content can be specified:

(72) I could hear from her quivering voice that Peter had been fighting
(73) I saw on her face that Peter had been fighting

(ii) In MP-constructions, but not in RP-constructions, the perception verb can be (and often is) accompanied by a modal verb (Lachlan Mackenzie, personal communication). Thus (70) can be interpreted as a MP-construction only. Specification of the source of the propositional content is ungrammatical:

(74) I could hear *(from John) that Jane had caught a cold

(iii) MP-constructions are semi-factive, as shown in the previous section, RP-constructions are non-factive:

(75) I could taste that the toast was burnt (*but it turns out that it wasn't)
I heard (from John) that Mary had caught a cold (but it turns out that she hadn’t)

The MP-construction in (75) is semi-factive: the speaker is committed to the truth of the complement. The RP-construction (76) is non-factive: the speaker is not committed to the truth of the complement.

(iv) The complements in RP-constructions may contain operators specifying a propositional attitude, the complements in MP-constructions may not:

(77) Mary heard from John that Peter might have been fighting/had probably been fighting

(78) *Mary tasted that the toast might be burnt/was probably burnt

This difference follows from the fact that the complement in (78) designates a propositional content which originates with the speaker, whereas the complement in (77) designates a reported propositional content which originates with a third party, whose propositional attitude may be part of the report.

3.3.2. The expression of MP- and RP-constructions

The distinction between MP- and RP-constructions is formally marked in some languages. Again the differences in form may concern (i) the complement type, in particular the form of the complement predicate, (ii) the complementizer.

3.3.2.1. Different complement types

A language which marks the distinction between MP and
RP through different complement types is GERMAN.\textsuperscript{12} Compare the following sentences:

(79) \textit{Er hört sie kommen}  \\
3sg.masc hear.Pres.3sg 3sg.fem come.Inf  \\
'He hears her come'

(80) \textit{Er hört dass sie kommt}  \\
3sg.masc hear.Pres.3sg Comp 3sg.fem come.Pres.Ind.3sg  \\
'He hears that she is coming'

(81) \textit{Er hört dass sie komme}  \\
3sg.masc hear.Pres.3sg Comp 3sg.fem come.Pres.Subj.3sg  \\
'He hears that she is coming'

Example (79) expresses IPSoA, example (80) MP or RP, example (81), RP. In German the subjunctive can be used in reported complement clauses (see Palmer 1986:138-9), which is what happens in (81). The use of the indicative or subjunctive in reported complements corresponds with a higher or lower degree of commitment of the speaker. The fact that (81) can only be used as a RP construction, whereas (80) can be used as a MP or RP construction, can be demonstrated by means of the following sentences:

(82) \textit{Er hört an ihren Schritten / von Peter dass sie kommt}  \\
3sg.masc hear.Pres.3sg from her footsteps / from Peter dass sie kommt  \\
Peter Comp 3sg.fem come.Pres.Ind.3sg  \\
'He hears from her footsteps / from Peter that she is coming'

\textsuperscript{12} For a similar phenomenon in Dutch see Holierhoek (1980:87). For a detailed study of verbs of hearing in German see Vliegen (1986).
The addition of satellites specifying the source of the information contained in the complement shows that in the case of subjunctive complements this source can only be a reported third party.

3.3.2.2. Different complementizers

SANGO (Pasch & Givón 1988) provides examples of what may be interpreted as the expression of the distinction between MP and RP through complementizers. Among other possibilities, Sango shows the following complements with the verb ma 'hear' (ibid. 90):

(84) Kosi à-ma Pepe à-ga
Kosi SM-hear Pepe SM-come
'Kosi heard that Pepe came/
Kosi heard of Pepe's coming'

(85) Kosi à-ma à-tènè Pepe à-ga
Kosi SM-hear SM-say Pepe SM-come
'Kosi heard that Pepe would come/
Kosi heard that Pepe might come'

In (85) the complementizer à-tènè appears, a frozen finite form of the verb 'say' with the impersonal pronoun à- as its subject. In (84) this complementizer is absent. Sentence (84) is used to express either certainty or factivity. In order to express factivity Sango has the additional possibility of a nominalized complement.
(85) is used to express inference or uncertainty. This seems to correlate well with our distinction between MP and RP.

3.3.3. The representation of RP-constructions

The following representation may be given to RP-constructions:

(86) RECEPTION OF THE PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT OF SPEECH ACT
    PERCEIVE (x_1)_{Proc} (\pi_3 \ x_1: [\pi_2 \ e_1: [\pi_1 \ Pred_B (x_1) \ldots (x_n)] (e_1)]) (x_1)

The open position for \(\pi_3\) operators is justified by the fact that the complement may contain operators specifying a propositional attitude, as illustrated above. This is the only difference between MP- and RP-constructions in underlying structure.

3.4. Immediate perception of state of affairs vs. Immediate perception of individual

In 3.1. we made a preliminary distinction between 'Immediate perception of Individual' (IPI) and 'Immediate perception of State of Affairs' (IPSoA), as exemplified in (87a) and (88a), with their predicate schemas as in (87b) and (88b):

(87)a I saw your brother last night.  
    b PERCEIVE (x_1)_{Proc} (x_2)_{Go}
(88)a I saw your brother walk down the street.  
    b PERCEIVE (x_1)_{Proc} (Sim e_1)_{Go}

This distinction is not as straightforward as it may seem to be. First of all, there have been alternative proposals for
the predicate frame underlying constructions of type (88a) (e.g. Dik (1981)). Second, many languages have constructions which might be interpreted as intermediate between (87) and (88), and as 'links' between the two construction types in a systematic, and perhaps even in a historical sense. Because of these intermediate cases, we discuss the relevant construction types starting from clear IPI cases as in (87), and ending up with clear IPSoA cases as in (88).

3.4.1. Differences between IPSoA- and IPI-constructions

The IPI frame as such is uncontroversial. It takes terms designating first-order entities for its second argument. Obviously, the entities must be such that they can be perceived by the particular kind of perception involved. Such first-order terms can obviously be modified by adjectival, participial, and other types of attributive restrictors:

\[(89)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
    a & \text{ I saw the naked wrestler.} \\
    b & \text{ I saw the running wrestler.}
\end{align*}
\]

More interestingly, many languages also allow constructions of the form:

\[(90)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
    a & \text{ I saw the wrestler naked.} \\
    b & \text{ I saw the wrestler running.}
\end{align*}
\]

Such constructions raise the problem of how precisely they should be interpreted. The first question to be posed is whether, given such constructions, the following entailments hold:
(91)a I saw the wrestler naked.
Therefore, I saw the wrestler.
b I saw the wrestler running.
Therefore, I saw the wrestler.

Let us suppose that these entailments do indeed hold in the given language. We then have reason to still regard [the wrestler] as the first-order argument of see, and of interpreting [naked] and [running] as 'predicative adjuncts' to this argument. In such conditions, the analysis should be along the lines of (92a) rather than (92b):

(92)a I saw [the wrestler]\textunderscore Go [naked]\textunderscore PredAdjunct
b I saw [the wrestler naked]\textunderscore Go

The question which is to be answered then is: how do we analyse the construction with the predicative adjunct (92a) in terms of FG? In answering this question we try to account for the traditional view that in one sense a predicative adjunct is an adjunct to the verb or the predication, while in another sense it is an attribute to the noun or term it goes with (in this case, [the wrestler]). This can be done by exploiting the following paraphrases:

(93)a I saw the wrestler naked.
b I saw the wrestler while he was naked.
c I saw the wrestler in the circumstance that he was naked.

We shall, in other words, interpret the predicative adjunct as a circumstantial satellite to the predication.\footnote{See Vester (1983) for the problem, Pinkster (1983) for the phenomenology of predicative adjuncts in Latin, and Van der Auwera (1985a, 1985b) for detailed discussion of "predicative relatives in French". We return to Van der Auwera’s analysis below.} In terms of the layered model of the clause, circumstantial satellites can
be interpreted as satellites which 'localize' the SoA designated by the core predication by relating it temporally to some other SoA. Therefore, it will belong to level 2. On the basis of these assumptions we can give the following analysis of (90a):

\[(94) \left[ \text{Past } e_i: [\text{see}_V (I)_{\text{Proc}} (d1x_i: \text{wrestler}_N(x_i))_{\text{G}}] (e_i) \right] (\text{Sim } e_j: [\text{naked}_A(x_i)_{\varnothing}] (e_j))_{\text{circ}}\]

Note the following points about this analysis:
- the SoA \(e_i\) of my seeing the wrestler is related to a SoA \(e_j\) defined by this wrestler being naked.
- thus, \([\text{naked}_A(x_i)_{\varnothing}]\) modifies the core predication through the circumstantial satellite relation.
- at the same time \([\text{naked}_A(x_i)_{\varnothing}]\) is defined as a property of \([\text{the wrestler}]\) through the referential index \(x_i\).
- it is an intrinsic property of (this type of) predicative adjunct that it should be simultaneous with the temporal specification of the core predication. This is expressed by the fixed operator \(\text{Sim}\).

As long as the entailment condition illustrated in (91a) holds, constructions such as (90b), with a participial predicative adjunct, can be analysed in the same way.

Van der Auwera (1985a) discusses the French construction which differs from (90a-b) in having a relative clause rather than an adjective or participle in predicative position. Compare:

\[(95)\]
\[(95)a \quad \text{Je l'ai vu ivre} \quad \text{I him have seen drunk} \quad \text{I saw him drunk}'
\[(95)b \quad \text{Je l'ai vu qui mourait} \quad \text{I him have seen who died} \quad \text{I saw him dying}'

With a wealth of arguments Van der Auwera demonstrates that the relative construction qui mourait in (95b) is neither a restrictor nor a non-restrictive (appositive) relative clause, but a 'predicative relative', such as we also find in:

(96) Il a les cheveux qui tombent
he has the hairs which fall
'His hair is falling out'

A particularly telling example for the parallelism with predicative adjectives is:

(97) Je voyais... les amis de M., les uns célèbres,
I saw ... the friends of M. the ones famous
les autres qui allaient l'être
the others who went it be
'I saw the friends of M., some famous, some on the point of becoming famous'

Although we find Van der Auwera's interpretation of the French data convincing, our analysis is different from his in that we should like to use the schema independently needed for such constructions as (90a) and (90b) above. We would thus analyse (95b) as:

(98) \[
\text{PresPerf } e_i: [\text{voir}_v (d1x_i:p1 (x_i))_{\text{Proc}} (d1x_j:p3 (x_j))_{\text{Go}} (e_i)] (\text{Sim } e_j: [\text{mourir}_v (Rx_j)_{\text{Proc}}] (e_j))_{\text{Circ}}
\]

Note that this analysis presupposes that the entailment condition holds. It appears that most of the characteristic properties of the construction (enumerated by Van der Auwera 1985a: 224ff.) can be accounted for in terms of this analysis. For example, consider the behaviour of the construction under Subj assignment. Given structure (98) we expect Subj assignment to the Goal term to be possible; such Subj
assignment should not affect the circumstantial satellite, since this is completely outside the core predication. This is exactly what we find:

(99)  Ton frère a été vu qui volait son voisin.
     your brother has been seen who robbed his neighbour
     'Your brother has been seen robbing his neighbour'

(100) *Ton frère qui volait son voisin a été vu.

In this analysis, then, (95b) is still a matter of 'perceiving a first-order individual', albeit 'an individual-as-involved-in-a-SoA'. Van der Auwera argues for an SoA analysis (which would nevertheless do justice to the relative clause character of qui mourait), mainly on semantic grounds.

It should be stressed here, however, that the difference between the IPI and IPSoA readings, although important in principle, may become very subtle in practice. We are here in a borderline area in which reinterpretation of the IPI construction in terms of IPSoA could easily occur. Compare, for example:

(101)a We saw [a man] [falling off a ladder].
     b We saw [a man falling off a ladder].

In (101a) we have represented the 'entity reading', in (101b) the 'SoA reading' (cf. Hannay 1985), but the message is not that different in the two readings. This might explain how an IPI construction such as (101a) could develop into an IPSoA construction such as (101b), through a loosening of the entailment condition.

Consider, in this connection, the following English examples, adduced by Kirsner and Thompson (1976) and Noonan (1985):

---

16 For this kind of argument cf. also De Geest (1970, 1972).
These examples show that the English construction with participle should be interpreted as IPSoA rather than IPI (see below). Note, however, that there is still the possibility that English has the two constructions side by side:

(105)a I heard [the children singing a song]
   b I heard [the children] [singing a song]

Finally, there is the construction with an infinitival complement, as in:

(106) I heard Sally sing a song.

In Dik (1981) this construction was analysed in terms of a three-place predicate frame of the following form:

(107) $\text{see}_V (x_1)_{\text{Proc}} (x_2)_{\text{Go}} (e_1; \ldots(x_2)\ldots) (e_1)_{\text{Compl}}$

This analysis was meant to account for the 'immediate perception' effect in terms of the FG means then available. But it disregarded the counterexamples against the entailment condition, as in (108)-(110) (cf. (102)-(104)):
We heard it thunder.

[We didn't hear 'it' in the circumstance that it was thundering]

If these examples are taken into account, we have to conclude that these constructions, as well, represent cases of IPSoA. Therefore, we may conclude that constructions of type (108) to (110) are two-place after all, and solidly represent the IPSoA case.

3.4.2. The expression of IPSoA- and IPI- constructions

In MODERN STANDARD ARABIC (and also in Egyptian Arabic, cf. Jelinek 1981) there is a particularly interesting way to distinguish the IPSoA-construction from the IPI-construction with a predicative adjunct. First consider the following sentence:

(111) ra'aytu-hu  qaahik-an
     see.Pf.lsg-3sg laugh.Part-Acc
     'I saw him laughing'

This sentence is ambiguous between an IPSoA- and an IPI-reading. In order to render the IPI-reading unambiguously, the following construction is used:

(112) ra'aytu -hu  wa huwa qaahik-un
     see.Pf.lsg-3sg and he laugh.Part-Nom
     'I saw him while he laughed'

In this sentence the predicative adjunct is separated from the main clause, thus turning the main clause into a clear IPI-construction.

Note, by the way, that (111) has a third reading, in which it is interpreted as a MP-construction. In order to
render this reading unambiguously, the following construction is used.

(113) ra‘aytu ‘anna-hu ḍaahik-un
see.Pf.1sg Comp-3sg laugh.Part-Nom
'I saw that he was laughing'

Here the complementizer 'anna indicates that the complement designates the mentally perceived propositional content.

3.4.2. The representation of IPSoA- and IPI- constructions

Summarizing, the following (rough) representations can be given for IPI-constructions, IPI-constructions with a predicative adjunct and IPSoA-constructions:

(114) IMMEDIATE PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL
PERCEIVE \((x_1)_{\text{Proc}} (x_2)_{\text{Go}}\)

(115) IMMEDIATE PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL + PRED. ADJUNCT
PERCEIVE \((x_1)_{\text{Proc}} (x_2)_{\text{Go}} (\text{Sim } e_1)_{\text{Circ}}\)

(116) IMMEDIATE PERCEPTION OF STATE OF AFFAIRS
PERCEIVE \((x_1)_{\text{Proc}} (\text{Sim } e_1)_{\text{Go}}\)

Both types of IPI-construction have a first order Goal argument designating the perceived and perceivable individual. The only difference between the two is that a circumstantial satellite, designating a SoA in which this individual is involved, has been added in the second type. The circumstantial satellite may be left out without affecting the grammaticality of the construction.

In the IPSoA-construction the constituent designating a SoA is the Goal argument of the perception verb. This Goal argument cannot be left out without affecting the grammaticality of the construction. It designates the perceived and perceivable event. The participants involved in
this event may but need not be perceivable.

4. Conclusion

In this paper we have presented a typology of complements, based on the hierarchical clause structure used in FG to represent utterances, and applied this typology to the complements of perception verbs. In this way we have been able to account for many semantic, formal and behavioural differences between these complements.
References


Dik, S.C. fc.a Embedded predications from a typological point of view. Paper, Institute for general linguistics, University of Amsterdam.


Perception verb complements


WORKING PAPERS IN FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR

ISSN: 0924-1205
Editor: Lachlan Mackenzie
Executive editors: Caroline Kroon & Rodie Risselada
Technical facilities: Institute for Functional Research of Language and Language Use (IFOTT).

WPFG publishes papers which are (a) not (yet) ready for official publication, but sufficiently interesting as contributions to on-going discussions within FG and (b) papers that will be officially published, but whose publication will take at least one year after publication in WPFG. For all information contact the following address:

Caroline Kroon/Rodie Risselada
Klassiek Seminarium
University of Amsterdam
Oude Turfmarkt 129
NL-1012 GC Amsterdam
tel. - (0)20 - 525 2559/2571

Papers can be ordered as follows:
(a) Transfer the required amount of money to postal account (giro) no. 5923629, in the name of C.H.M. Kroon -inz. WPFG-, Amsterdam;
(b) From abroad send an international money order written out in Dutch guilders to the editorial address. Please specify the required items. Do not send an euro- or other cheque!
For standing orders contact the above address.

The following papers are now available:

1. Martin Harris - Word order in contemporary French: a functional view. f 5.00.
4. Peter Kahrel - Some aspects of derived intransitivity. f 6.00.
7. Louis Goossens - The auxiliarization of the English modals. f 6.00.
10. A. Moutaouakil - Towards an adequate representation of illocutionary force in FG. f 5.00.
13. Albert Rijksbaron - The pragmatics and semantics of conditional and temporal clauses; some evidence from Dutch and Classical Greek. f 6.00
15. Lachlan Mackenzie - Aspects of nominalization in English and Dutch. f 6.00.
16. Co Vet - A pragmatic approach to tense in FG. f 5.00.
17. Lourens de Vries - The Wambon relator system. f 6.00.
18. Simon Dik - Two papers on the computational application of FG. f 6.00.
22. Kees Hengeveld - The Spanish mood system. f 6.00.
23. Kees Hengeveld - A functional analysis of copula constructions in Mandarin. f 5.00.
24. Hetty Voogt - Constructing an FG lexicon on the basis of LDOCE. f 5.00.
27. Kees Hengeveld - Layers and operators. f 5.00.
29. Jan Rijkehoff - A typology of operators. f 5.00.
30. Peter Harder - The instructional semantics of conditionals. f 5.00.
32. Hella Olbertz - Periphrastic Aspect in Spanish. f 5.00.
33. Roland Tweehuysen - An FG Analysis of Spocanian Passive Constructions. f 5.00
34. Rodie Risselada - Illocutionary function and functional illocution. f 5.00
35. Cees Hesp - A critique of FG-CNLU. f 5.00
36. Tim van Baar - The Dutch perspectivity particles in FG. f 5.00
37. Simon C. Dik and Kees Hengeveld - The hierarchical structure of the clause and the typology of perception verb complements. f 5.00
38. Mike Hannay; J. Lachlan Mackenzie and M. Evelien Keizer - Pragmatic functions: the view from the V.U. f 6.00

Also available are Simon Dik's 1978 monograph *Stepwise lexical decomposition* (f 5.00) and a complete bibliography of FG books, articles and papers (f 2.50). These items can be ordered in the same way as a Working Paper.