Mirativity and Exclamatives in Functional Discourse Grammar: evidence from Spanish

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Abstract:

This paper is a critical evaluation of the FDG claim that Mirativity is a Basic Illocution (cf. e.g. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008). The view presented here is that Mirativity is a semantic concept, while “Mirative Illocution” is in fact Exclamative Illocution. On the basis of data from Ecuadorian Highland Spanish, which has both a grammaticalized Mirative and a grammaticalized Exclamative, it is shown that there are a number of systematic differences between Mirative and Exclamative utterances. The paper ends with an alternative proposal of how to account for these two concepts within FDG.
1. Introduction

In Functional Discourse Grammar, as described in Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008), Mirativity is considered to be a Basic Illocution. The authors claim that Mirative Illocution differs from Declarative Illocution in that “the intention behind a Mirative Discourse Act is not to pass on a Communicated Content, as in Declarative Discourse Acts, but pass on surprise about a Communicated Content typically presupposed to be known to the Addressee” (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008:73). The following example is regarded as a realization of Mirative Illocution in English:

(1) *How beautifully she sang!* (ibid.)

Let us consider some other Mirative expressions. In example (2), from Tarma Quechua, Mirativity is expressed by means of the morphological marker *-na*, and in (3), from Ecuadorian Highland Spanish, it is expressed analytically by means of the present perfect form:

(2) Tarma Quechua (Adelaar 1977:98)
   čawraqa ča:qa ka:ku-na alqu.
   then that was.3-MIR dog
   ‘So it turned out that he was a dog.’

(3) Ecuadorian Highland Spanish (FN, 2003)
   [a clerk of a university library has been looking for a journal in the repository]
   Ha habido sólo dos números.
   has there been only two issues
   ‘(It turns out) there are only two issues.’

What examples (1)-(3) have in common is that they express the speaker’s view that the content of the utterance in question is somehow remarkable. They differ, however, with respect to the ways in which the speaker’s stance is being expressed. It is this difference which will be the focus of my paper. The most obvious difference between example (1) on the one hand and (2) and (3) on the other is their forms: (1) begins with a question word, but has a non-interrogative syntactic structure and intonation, whereas in (2) and (3) there is no question word and the speaker’s stance is expressed in the verbal complex through morphological and periphrastic means, respectively. Somewhat less obviously, the propositional content is presupposed in (1), whereas in (2) and (3) it is both the propositional content as well as the speaker’s view on this content that is being transmitted. My claim is that example (1) is not a Mirative but an Exclamative utterance (cf. Dik 1997 I:302, II:239)², whereas (2) and (3) are both Mirative and Declarative utterances.

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² Interestingly, the description of Mirativity by Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008) quoted above closely parallels Dik’s definition of Exclamative Illocution.
It is the aim of this paper to disentangle the concepts of Mirativity and Exclamative Illocution and to propose a way in which both can be accounted for within the framework of Functional Discourse Grammar. More specifically, I will show that Miratives differ from Exclamatives with respect to their syntax and semantics in such a way that they should be considered concepts of different kinds: the latter is a pragmatic concept, expressing the speaker’s attitude towards the Communicated Content at the Interpersonal Level in FDG, whereas the former is a semantic concept, modifying the Propositional Content at the Representational Level.

The essential evidence for my claim comes from Spanish, where Mirativity is expressed through grammatical means in one group of dialects only, i.e. Andean Spanish. Therefore, my account of the mirative will be based on fieldnotes and elicited data from Ecuadorian Highland Spanish, while the evidence regarding the Exclamative will mainly come from the “Macrocorpus”, a corpus of spoken urban European and American Spanish (Samper Padilla et al. 1998).3

My paper will be structured as follows: in section 2 I will present the properties of Miratives and Exclamatives and end in working definitions of both notions. In section 3 I will compare how Exclamatives and Miratives react to two syntactic tests. Section 4 will be devoted to redefining Exclamative Illocution and Mirativity in FDG, and section 5 will contain my conclusions.

In the remainder of this paper I will use upper case exclusively when explicitly referring to FDG concepts as established in FDG literature. In the discussion of mirativity and exclamative illocution in sections 2 and 3, I will use lower case throughout, reflecting the pretheoretical nature of this discussion.

2. Miratives and exclamatives

This section will be concerned with a presentation of the properties of miratives (2.1) and exclamatives (2.2) in general and in Spanish in particular. I will end with an intermediate conclusion (2.3).

2.1 Miratives

In this section I will first present the notion of mirativity such as expressed in various languages and then focus on the case of Ecuadorian Highland Spanish (henceforward: EHS), presenting the properties of mirative expressions in this dialect. I will end this section with a preliminary definition of mirativity.

In his seminal paper on mirativity, DeLancey (1997) discusses the morpheme lô in Hare (Athapascan), which generally expresses inferential evidentiality. In the example given below, however, lô is used in a context that does not allow for an inferential reading, given the fact that it is a case of direct perception:

(4) [the speaker has been molested for some time by falling branches; when looking up, he discovers the source of the harassment sitting in a tree above him]
heee, gûhde daweda!  ch’ifi dach’ida lô!
hey up.there sit.3SG.IMPF guy sitting INFER

3 All corpora will be given in the references. In the examples, fieldnotes will be rendered as FN, followed by the speaker’s name (when known) and the year of annotation; elicitations will be indicated as Q 2008.
'Hey, he’s sitting up there! The guy’s sitting up there!' (DeLancey 1997:39)

In this case the morpheme lõ expresses the fact that the speaker has just discovered what he describes, a notion which turns out to be grammatically relevant in different genetically unrelated languages, and which DeLancey (1997) terms “mirativity”. In several languages, perfect aspect or past tense morphemes serve the additional purpose of expressing mirativity. In the Permic language Komi (Leinonen & Vilkuna 2000), for instance, the so-called past2 has a resultative and inferential function, but can also express mirativity. In example (5) the mirative is the only possible reading, given the fact that what is described here is direct perception and has present time reference:

(5) Mis’a, gaškö, te munin n’in. A tani na völömyd.
    I think perhaps you go:PST1:2SG already but here still be:PST2:2SG ‘I thought you had already gone. But here still you are.’
    (Juškov 1970:97, quoted from Leinonen & Vilkuna 2000:501)

Similarly, the perfect in Tajik expresses tense/aspect, various modal and evidential meanings and a mirative meaning (Perry 2000), such as illustrated in the following example:

(6) odami xub buda-ast
    man good he-has-been ‘it turns out he’s a good man (after all)’ (Perry 2000:235)

A well known though not uncontroversial case is the perfect aspect morpheme -mIš in Turkish (cf. Slobin & Aksu 1982; Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986), which has three non-aspectual functions: it serves to express inference, hearsay and mirativity, the interpretation depending on the linguistic or non-linguistic context. Example (7) has a mirative reading, given the fact that it is the speaker’s evaluation of an event, i.e. the piano recital, at which he is present.

(7) Kız-ınz çok iyi piyano çal-iyor-muš
    daughter-2PL.POSS very good piano play-PRES-mIš ‘Your daughter plays the piano very well!’
    (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986:162)

Although the case of Turkish -mIš as illustrated in (7) has been quoted in the literature on mirativity as a paradigmatic case, it should be noted that Aksu-Koç & Slobin (1986:162) themselves refer to surprise as one of the possible “pragmatic extensions” of the use of -mIš. Johanson (2000) argues that, although in the context of direct perception the use of indirectives can “often be interpreted in terms of sudden discovery, unexpectedness, surprise, new knowledge, perception contrary to one’s expectations etc.” (2000:82), DeLancey (1997) overexploits this function of -mIš for the purpose of introducing mirativity as a grammatical category. With respect to example (7) Johanson describes the additional information expressed by -mIš simply as ‘as I hear’, and terms this kind of usage ‘perceptive’ (2000:75). A similar view is held by Van Schaaik (pers. com.).
In Quechua studies, the mirative has become known as “sudden discovery tense”, a term coined by Adelaar in his (1977) description of Tarma Quechua.\(^5\) Most Quechua dialects are similar to the languages discussed above in that both mirativity and hearsay are additional functions of perfect aspect or past tense markers. In Ecuadorian Quechua the perfect, also termed “narrative past”, is expressed by the morpheme \(-shka\).\(^6\) Consider the following example from Ecuadorian Quechua:

(8) \(kipi \ llashak-mi \ ka-shka-ø\)

Bundle heavy-AFF be-PERF-3SG

“the bundle is heavy indeed” (cf. Muysken 1977:60)

It is through contact with Quechua that the mirative has been introduced into Andean Spanish (Muysken 1985; Granda 2002). Example (9) from rural EHS illustrates the parallel between the Spanish and the Quechua construction:

(9) [while eating a broth]

EHS: \(Rico \ ha_{sido}.\)\(^7\)

Good be.PERF.3SG

Quechua: \(Alli-mi \ ga-shka-ø.\)

Good-AFF be-PERF-3SG

“It is good (indeed)” (Muysken 1985:391)

In a syntactically analogous way the perfect is used for the expression of mirativity in both languages.\(^8\)

The remainder of this section will be devoted to the use of the mirative in urban Ecuadorian Highland Spanish. To begin with, let us consider an additional example:

(10) [speaker points at fruit that looks like yellowish apples]

\(Mire, compró \ estos, los \ probé ... y ... \ han \ sido peras!\)

Look bought.PF.3SG these them tried.PF.1SG and have.3PL been pears

“Look, she bought these, I tasted them ... and ... they are pears!” (FN, Graciela, 2003)

As the last part of this example, which contains the relevant use of the present perfect marker, has unequivocal present time reference, it is more obvious than in example (2) that a temporal or aspectual interpretation of the perfect is out of the question. In other

\(^5\) Tarma Quechua belongs to a small dialect group, termed Quechua I, as opposed to the much larger Quechua II (cf. Adelaar with Muysken 2004:183-191). The dialects quoted in the remainder of this paper are Quechua II.

\(^6\) It is above all in narratives that \(-shka\) fulfils a hearsay function. In this function it competes with other grammatical and lexical expressions of reportative evidentiality. See e.g. Cole (1982) for Ecuadorian Quechua and Hannß (2004) for Cuzco Quechua.

\(^7\) Apart from the fact that in “general Spanish”, i.e. geographically relatively unmarked urban Spanish, the mirative use of the perfect does not exist, the Spanish expression in this example is deviant in an additional respect: instead of the participle of the unmarked copula \(sido\), one would expect that of the contingent copula \(estado\). This deviant copula use is one of the features of rural EHS that betrays the intimate contact with Quechua.

\(^8\) Interestingly, the pluperfect rather than the perfect is used for the expression of mirativity in the South-Andean area, i.e. in the Spanish spoken in Bolivia, Peru and northern Argentine. A plausible explanation of this difference has been given by Granda (2002).
words, the mirative is the only possible reading in this case. In the following example, the perfect is even used with future time reference:

(11) El año que viene ha sido bisiesto.
   the year that come.3SG has.3SG been leap-year
   ‘Next year is a leap year (I just realize it).’ (Toscano Mateus 1953:260)

This case is remarkable because the time reference expressed by subject referent el año que viene, literally ‘the year that comes’, outrightly contradicts the tense-aspect semantics of the perfect.

It is only for past time reference that there is a specific form of the mirative, i.e. the pluperfect:

(12) [speaker narrates that he had to sleep in a windy cave; he tried to find out where the wind came from]
    pero no había habido huecos en la roca.
    but not have.IMPF.3SG had holes in the rock
    ‘but it turned out there were no holes in the rock’ (Kany 1970:208)

The examples of mirative expressions we have considered so far in this section all have declarative illocution. However, in EHS the mirative perfect can also be used in questions:

(13) ¿y el hijo de la señora Anita no ha estado aquí?
    and the son of the mrs. Anita not has.3SG been(contingent) here
    ‘and Mrs. Anita’s son is not here?’ (Bustamante 1991:203)

This example is a polar question which simultaneously expresses the idea that the speaker had expected the boy in question is to be present. Alternatively, the speaker could use a content question asking for the reason for the absence of the boy and at the same time expressing surprise at his absence:

(13)a. y el hijo de la señora Anita ¿por qué no ha estado aquí?
    and the son of the mrs. Anita why not has.3SG been(contingent) here
    ‘and Mrs. Anita’s son, why isn’t he here?’ (Q 2008)

This means that in EHS mirativity can be expressed in both declarative and interrogative utterances, the latter comprising both polar and content questions.

In conclusion, the data presented in this section have several characteristics in common: (i) in all cases, the mirative is a secondary or tertiary meaning of some grammatical distinction; (ii) in all cases, except that of Hare, perfect aspect or past tense are the primary meanings; (iii) in all cases, except that of Spanish, some evidential
meaning is involved;\(^9\) (iv) in all cases the mirative concerns permanent or contingent states. The last property, which was observed earlier by Comrie (2000:6), is probably related to the “territory-sharing” between evidential and mirative. While previous descriptions of the mirative in the literature concern only declarative utterances, it is certain at least for EHS that the use of the mirative is not restricted to declarative illocution.

As regards the semantics of the mirative, the data presented in this section allow for the conclusion that mirativity is the linguistic marking of an utterance as conveying information which is not previously known to the speaker (DeLancey 2001:369-370), or, more precisely, of the speaker’s “sudden awareness of a fact hitherto unknown, unappreciated or not considered relevant to the present” (Perry 2000:237), which, as a general rule, entails surprise.

2.2 Exclamatives

In this section I will first discuss the formal expression of exclamatives on the basis of data from various languages, with special emphasis on Spanish, and then go into their pragmatic properties.

Example (1), which I repeat here for convenience, and example (14) from the Internet may serve as a starting point for the discussion of the form of exclamative utterances:

(1)  *How beautifully she sang!*
(14)  *What a nice guy he was!*

Both (1) and (14) are similar to content questions, but they have a number of clearly different properties: the *how*-exclamative in (1) lacks *do*-support, and (14) has an uninverted subject-verb order and starts with *what a* instead of *what*; both (1) and (14) have an exclamative rather than an interrogative intonation. According to Collins (2005:5f), examples (1) and (14) illustrate the only unambiguous expressions of the exclamative in English. Following Collins (2005), I consider exclamatives only those linguistic expressions that are formally marked as such, in other words, I will consider only grammaticalized exclamatives. This excludes cases such as the following example from Setswana (Bantu), in which the subordinating predicate is a lexical means to express the surprise, which in cases of grammaticalized exclamatives is expressed by the illocution itself:

(15)  *Ke matkatswa ke gore o dirisitse bokae*
     *I am amazed by that she used how-much*
     ‘I am amazed at how much she spent’ (Michaelis 2001:1043)

\(^9\)The analysis of Muysken’s corpus of Salcedo reveals that in rural EHS in contact with Quechua the present perfect has an evidential function in certain contexts, too. However, in contrast to what has been claimed by e.g. Bustamante (1991), I have not found any convincing evidence that this use has entered the regional standard, i.e. educated urban EHS. In my view, the situation in urban EHS is similar to that of Argentine Andean Spanish described by Granda (2002), where only the mirative function of the perfect has entered the regional standard.
It seems that cross-linguistically the information-question type illustrated in (1) and (14) above is the most widespread type of formal marking of exclamatives (Michaelis 2001:1045). The examples below illustrate this type in three genetically unrelated languages; example (16) is from Turkish, (17) from Ecuadorian Quechua, and (18) from Georgian.

(16) Ne aptal korkak bir kaz-im ben ki!
what stupid timid one girl-SG1 I EMPH
‘What a stupid timid girl I am!’ (Van Schaaik, pers. com.)

(17) Imashina cai huañushca cusa manchanai-ta micu-n-ari
how this dead husband terror-ADV eat-3-EMPH
‘How terribly this dead husband is eating!’ (Catta 1994:195)

(18) ra ušno-ø bič'-i=a
what uncharm-NOM boy-NOM=be.PRES.3SG
‘What an ugly guy this is!’ (Asatiani, pers. com.)

Turning to the language in focus, Spanish is said to have exclamative expressions with three different question words: cuánto ‘how much’, cómo ‘how’, and qué ‘what’ (Alonso Cortés 1999:4008), illustrated successively in (19)-(21):

(19) ¡Y cuánta gente habrá así!
how-many.F people(F) there-be.FUT.3SG like-this
‘And how many people will be like this!’ (MC, Costa Rica 14)

(20) ¡cómo ha pasado el tiempo!
how has.3SG passed the time
‘How the time has passed!’ (MC, Gran Canaria 09)

(21) ¡Qué coraje me da!
what fury me-DAT give.3SG
literally: “What a fury it gives me!”
‘How furious this makes me!’ (Salcedo, 18b)

Apart from the fact that the exclamatives with cuánto and cómo are much less frequent than those with qué, only utterances with qué are of an unambiguously exclamative nature: while both (19) and (20) can be read as rhetorical questions, such a reading is excluded in the case of (21). Therefore, I will consider true exclamatives only those with qué, which correspond to English exclamatives with how when followed by an adjective and with what when followed by a noun:

10 The Macrocorpus (746,931 words) contains 4 exclamative utterances with cuánto, 27 with cómo and 127 with qué. This count includes both holophrastic and sentential exclamatives.
Although for the purpose of this study, only sentential exclamatives are of interest, it should be mentioned that the vast majority of Spanish exclamatives are holophrases: of the 127 tokens of qué-exclamatives in the Macrocorpus, 121 are holophrastic. The following example may serve as an illustration:

(24) ¡Qué curioso!
what strange
‘How strange!’ (MC, La Paz 05)

Let us now turn to the pragmatics of exclamatives. The exclamative utterances illustrated in (14)-(18), and (21)-(24) above have the common property that the content concerns the speaker’s personal evaluation of something s/he physically perceives or has in mind at the moment of speaking. This evaluation is what the speaker primarily communicates, rather than the content itself, which is presupposed, either in the sense that the addressee is expected to see, hear or otherwise physically perceive what motivates the speaker’s emotional reaction, or in the sense of simply not being subject to discussion. In other words, exclamatives do not primarily serve to provide the addressee with information, “but rather to express the speaker’s affective stance or attitude” (Collins 2005:4). This is evidenced by the fact that exclamatives cannot be felicitously used as an answer to a question (ibid.). Consider in the following contextualization of example (1):

(1)a. –Did you like her concert?
  ?–How beautifully she sang!

As a consequence, the perlocutionary effect of the utterance on the addressee is different from that of declaratives: in the case of declaratives the addressee is supposed to add information to his/her knowledge of the world or of the situation, whereas in that of exclamatives, the addressee is expected to take note of the speaker’s affective stance towards some piece of information, which may already form part of his/her knowledge.11

To sum up, we have seen that in many languages there is a specific grammaticalized expression of exclamative illocution, which is often similar to a question-word

11 Beyssade & Marandin (2006) even claim that exclamatives do not aim at any perlocutionary effect at all: “It is intended as expressing Speaker’s own opinion and Addressee is only involved as witness of such an opinion” (2006: 58). However, this analysis fails to account for the use of tag-questions with exclamatives, such as in (i).

(i) ¿Qué programa más bueno, verdad?
what programme more good truth
‘What a good programme, isn’t it?’ (MC, Madrid, 14)
construction. Exclamatives express the speaker's personal evaluation of a given piece of information. The propositional content of the exclamative utterance is presupposed. This presupposedness probably is the reason why exclamative expressions tend to be holophrastic in languages such as Spanish and English (cf. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008:73-74 on Miratives).12

2.3 Intermediate conclusion

In sections 2.1 and 2.2 I have shown that there are several genetically unrelated languages that have two different grammatical expressions for miratives on the one hand and exclamatives on the other (viz. Turkish, Quechua, and Ecuadorian Highland Spanish), which in itself may be a sufficient reason to distinguish these notions. In addition, there are systematic linguistic differences between miratives and exclamatives, which will be considered in section 3.

3. Miratives versus exclamatives

In this section I will compare the Spanish realizations of the mirative and the exclamative with each other, in order to show that mirative and exclamative utterances are different with respect to their semantics and syntax. The semantic difference concerns polarity, and the syntactic difference concerns the possibility of relativizing mirative and exclamative utterances.

Starting with the semantics of miratives and exclamatives, we have seen that mirative expressions may be both positively and negatively polar: examples (12) and (13) contain a negation, while the remainder of the mirative examples has positive polarity. Example (25) is an additional case of a negatively polar mirative:

(25) [reaction of an informant to an instruction of how to fill in a questionary]
¡No ha sido difícil!
not has.3SG been difficult
‘Oh, it’s not difficult (I just realize this)’ (FN, Consuelo, 2003)

The exclamative examples quoted so far are all positively polar. The negation of an exclamative yields an ungrammatical result, both in Spanish and in English:

(26)a. *¡Qué cuidad-a no estás!13
what careful-F not be(contingent).2SG
‘*How careful you aren’t!’

12 Collins (2005:13) finds that in his corpora of spoken English, 84.3% of the what-exclamatives (204 of a total of 242), and 50.3% (158/314) of the how-exclamatives are holophrases. We saw above that in the case of Spanish, the relative frequency of holophrastic constructions is even higher. Quechua has holophrastic exclamatives as well (Parker 1969:136 on Ayacucho Quechua; Adelaar 1977:255 on Tarma) but they are insufficiently described to allow for more than guessing at the quantitative relation between the sentential and holophrastic type. Georgian has no holophrastic exclamatives at all, and in Turkish it is impossible to distinguish between holophrases and sentences given the lack of a copula
13 In data from 18th and 19th century literature, expressions like (26a.) do occur with a certain frequency. However, in these cases the negation particle no does not have a polar value, but rather serves as an emphatic marker:
For a negative value in exclamatives the speaker has to resort to lexical means of expression:

(26) b. ¡Qué poco cuidad-a estás!
what little careful-F be(contingent).2SG
‘How little careful you are!’

(26) c. ¡Qué descuidad-a estás!
what careless-F be(contingent).2SG
‘How careless you are!’

(José Donoso, Casa de campo. 1978, Chile [CREA])

From this example we can conclude that in Spanish and English exclamatives have an inherently positive polarity. But the restriction of exclamatives to positive polarity holds for German, Dutch, French, Turkish (Van Schaaik, pers. com.), and Georgian (Asatiani, pers. com.), too, which means that it may well be an intrinsic semantic property of exclamatives. Obviously, this does not hold for miratives.

Turning to syntax, consider the following mirative example:

(27) [speaker tells about she suddenly stumbling when walking through the jungle] 
Me agarré de un árbol, que no había sido.
REFL.1SG held.PF.1SG of a tree which not had.IMPF.3SG been
‘I held on to a tree, which turned out not to be one.’ (FN, Irene, 2003)

In this example the mirative expression is contained in a relative clause, more specifically, in a non-restrictive relative clause. Since exclamatives do not occur in relative clauses in my corpus, let us consider a made-up example; (28) contains an exclamative utterance, which is relativized in (28a):

(28) [I would arrive at the bridge across the Tiber and I would pass it surrounded by] 
los ángeles de Bernini [...] ¡Qué hermos-o-s eran
the angels(M) by Bernini how beautiful-M-PL were.3PL
y qué triste-s!
and how sad-PL
‘[...] the angels by Bernini [...] How beautiful they were and how sad!’

(Manuel Mujica Lainez, El escarabajo. 1982, Argentine [CREA])

(i) ¡Qué aspavientos y qué extremos no hizo
what flappings and what extremes not did.PF.3SG
la santa señora!
the holy lady
‘What a ridiculous fuss the good lady made!’

(José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, Periquillo Sarniento. 1802, Mexico [Davies])

In present day Spanish, the use of the expletive negative is restricted to exclamatives and rhetorical questions with cuánto and qué de ‘how much/many’ with absolute or relative future tense (Sánchez López 1999:2629f).
(28)a. *los ángeles de Bernini que ¡qué hermos-o-s eran
the angels(M) by Bernini which how beautiful-M-PL were.IMPF.3PL
y qué triste-s!
and how sad-PL
‘*the angels by Bernini, which how beautiful they were and how sad!’

The exclamative non-restrictive relative clause in (28a.) is ungrammatical, as is its English translation. Conversely (28b.), in which the exclamative is reformulated as a declarative, is grammatical:

(28)b. los ángeles de Bernini que eran tan hermos-o-s
the angels(M) by Bernini which were.IMPF.3PL so beautiful-M-PL
y tan triste-s.
and so sad-PL
‘the angels by Bernini, which were so beautiful and so sad.

Lyons (1977:760) mentions the fact that “[n]on-restrictive relative clauses may have a different illocutionary force associated with them from that which is associated with the rest of the text-sentence within which they occur.” Lyons illustrates this with a declarative non-restrictive relative clause in the context of a question. Example (29a.) below shows that the reverse is not possible, i.e. to have a non-restrictive relative clause with an interrogative illocutionary force within the context of a declarative sentence.

(29) hay funcionari-o-s encargad-o-s de las divers-a-s
there_be employee-M-PL responsible-M-PL of the various-F-PL
zona-s que son muy poc-o-s;
zone(F)-PL who are.3PL very few-M-PL
‘there are men in charge of the various zones, who are very few’ (MC, Bogotá 01)

(29)a. *hay funcionari-o-s encargad-o-s de las divers-a-s
there_be employee-M-PL responsible-M-PL of the various-F-PL
zona-s, que ¿son muy poc-o-s?
zona(F)-PL who are.3PL very few-M-PL
‘*there are men in charge of the various zones, who are they very few?’

Given the fact that it is equally impossible to have exclamatives or questions in non-restrictive relative clauses in German, Dutch, French, Turkish, and Georgian, we may conclude (i) that, cross-linguistically, non-restrictive relative clauses tend to have a declarative illocution and (ii) that exclamatives differ from miratives in that they

14 Apart from declaratives, we also find optatives in non-restrictive relative clauses:
(i) [the man who looked like a ram went to the station, accompanied by]
el poeta, a quien Dios tenga en su gloria
the poet, PREP who god have.SUBJ.3SG in his glory
‘the poet, whom God may have in his glory’
(Carlos Rojas, El ingenioso hidalgo y poeta Federico García Lorca asciende a los infernos. 1982, Spain [CREA])

I would like to thank Kees Hengeveld for drawing my attention to this point.
cannot appear in non-restrictive relative clauses.
I hope to have shown with these two tests that exclamative is an illocution, and that
mirativity is not. In the next section, I will propose possible ways of accounting for this
difference in Functional Discourse Grammar.

4. Exclamative Illocution and Mirativity in Functional Discourse Grammar

The first issue I will address in this section is the place of Exclamative Illocution in
FDG (4.1). Turning to Mirativity (4.2), I will first discuss the question whether
Mirativity corresponds to the Interpersonal or to the Representational Level of grammar,
and then go into its relation to other knowledge-related distinctions.

4.1 Exclamative Illocution

Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008:72-75) give a description of Exclamative Illocution that
is largely in line with my descriptions given of exclamatives in sections 2.2 and 3., the
only difference being that, in my view mistakenly, the two authors term Exclamative
“Mirative”. The definition of Exclamative Illocution, whenever grammatically relevant
in a language, should read as follows:

(30) EXCLamative: the Speaker expresses his/her affective stance about the
Propositional Content evoked by the Communicated Content.

Although this definition heavily leans on Hengeveld’s and Mackenzie’s (2008:72)
definition of Mirative Illocution, I refrain from restricting Exclamative Illocution to the
expression of surprise, because the emotional reaction expressed by means of
exclamatives can also be anger, as in examples (21) and (22), or discontent, such as in
examples (16) and (26c.).

The Exclamative Illocutionary frame in FDG would have to be as follows:

(31) (A1: [(F1: EXCL (F1)) (P1)S (P2)A (C1)] (A1))Φ

In this representation A represents the Discourse Act, F the abstract illocutionary
predicate, P the participants in the interaction, Speaker and Addressee, and C the
Communicated Content; the variable Φ represents the functions the Act can fulfil within
a Move (e.g. Motivation, Concession) (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008:50-107).

4.2 Mirativity

In order to locate Mirativity in FDG, the first question that has to be answered concerns
the level at which Mirativity operates. If Mirativity operates on the Interpersonal Level,
as does Exclamative Illocution, it modifies the Communicated Content, and if it
operates at the Representational Level, it modifies the Propositional Content.15 Let us

15 Theoretically, Mirativity could also apply to other entities at the Representational Level, i.e. either the
Episode or the State of Affairs. However, given the subjective semantics of Mirativity, only the
Propositional Content is a serious option.
first consider the difference between Communicated Contents and Propositional Contents as described by Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008:144):

A major difference between Communicated Contents and Propositional Contents is that Communicated Contents are Speaker-bound, whereas Propositional Contents are not, at least not necessarily. This means that Propositional Contents can be attributed without problems to persons other than the Speaker.

As the following example shows, Mirativity can be expressed when the referent is not the speaker:

(32) [Fernando had invited a lot of people to a garden party. The party was going to begin at 3 p.m., but at 2 p.m.] vió que algunos amigos ya habían estado allí
‘he saw some friends were already there!’ (Q 2008)

In this example, Mirativity, expressed by the past perfect, applies to a Propositional Content that is attributed to a third person singular subject rather than to the Speaker. For Mirativity in FDG, this means that it does not operate on the Communicated Content at the Interpersonal Level, but must be accounted for at the Representational Level.

At the Representational Level, there are a considerable number of operators that are similar to Mirativity in the sense that they are related to the subject’s knowledge with respect to the propositional content. Hengeveld & Mackenzie subdivide operators at the propositional layer “into distinctions concerned with the degree and the type of commitment with respect to a Propositional Content (subjective epistemic modality) and distinctions concerned with the source of the Propositional Content (evidential modality)” (2008:153). The question with which of these two Mirativity should be associated, is a hotly debated issue.

Mirativity has often been associated with evidentiality in the literature because of the fact that evidentials and miratives tend to share the same expression format (cf. section 2.1 above). The frequently quoted “unprepared mind” (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986:164) seems to be what miratives have in common with evidentials: the speaker has not participated either in the event (evidential modality) or in the developments that lead to the situation described (mirativity), and thus feels psychologically distanced from the event or situation s/he is describing. Lazard’s (2001:362) proposal to include mirativity and evidential meanings in a wider category to be called “mediative” is in line with this view, where “mediative” corresponds to the meaning “as it appears”; the “mediative” is the marked case, which contrasts with the unmarked case, i.e. the lack of evidential or mirative marking. On the other hand, Plungian (2001) takes the stance that the mirative meaning is not evidential, given the fact that “it does not mark the way of access to P, but the extent to which the speaker is ready to perceive P”, i.e. it is modal in the sense that “it deals with a special kind of judgement: a judgement concerning the speaker’s expectations” (ibid.:355). The disadvantage of Lazard’s proposal is that it blurs the concept of evidentiality in order to accommodate mirativity. Plungian’s proposal is
preferable, since it leaves the decision of the precise nature of Mirativity open to further research.

Following Plungian (2001), I propose to deal with Mirativity as a modal distinction, which is independent of evidential modality. It is also independent of epistemic modality given the fact that Mirativity is not concerned with the Speaker’s or the subject referent’s commitment to the truth of a possible fact, but rather with his or her knowledge status with respect to the Propositional Content. MIR should therefore be added as the sole representative of an independent set of Modal operators to the layer of the Propositional Content.

In an FDG frame at the layer of the Propositional Content (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008:156), MIR would have to be represented as follows:

\[
(33) \quad \text{MIR} p_1; \ [(e p_1) \ldots (e p_{1+N}) \ {\phi_1}]; [\sigma (p_1) \ a_0]
\]

This representation should be read as any Mirative proposition containing any number of Episodes with any function, to be modified by any propositional satellite with any function.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that the way in which the concept of Mirativity is used by Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008) is based on a misunderstanding. What Hengeveld & Mackenzie refer to with the term “Mirative” is in fact Exclamative Illocution (cf. also Dik 1997 I:302, II:239). Mirative is a semantic distinction, which in FDG should be accounted as such as a modal operator at the Representational Level.

I have shown that are at least three reasons for assuming that Mirative and Exclamative are different concepts: first, unlike Exclamative Illocution, Mirative Propositional Contents can have negative polarity; secondly, Mirative Propositional Contents can occur in non-restrictive relative clauses, which Exclamative Illocution cannot, given the fact that non-restrictive relative clauses are inherently Declarative; finally, Mirative Proposional Contents may occur within Acts with Declarative or Interrogative Illocution, which proves that they cannot be an Illocution themselves.

Abbreviations in glosses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>accusative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADV</td>
<td>adverbializer</td>
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<td>AFF</td>
<td>affirmative validation</td>
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<td>DAT</td>
<td>dative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMPH</td>
<td>emphasis</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
References


Perry, John R. 2000. Epistemic verb forms in Perian of Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. In Lars Johanson & Bo Utas (eds.).


Corpus


[Salcedo] Unpublished corpus of Spanish in contact with Quechua compiled by Pieter Muysken in 1978 in and near the town of Salcedo, province of Cotopaxi, Ecuador.